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ABSTRACT
Defense against Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks is one of the primary
concerns on the Internet today. DDoS attacks are difficult to prevent because of the open,
interconnected nature of the Internet and its underlying protocols, which can be used in several
ways to deny service. Attackers hide their identity by using third parties such as private chat
channels on IRC (Internet Relay Chat). They also insert false return IP address, spoofing, in a
packet which makes it difficult for the victim to determine the packet's origin.
We propose three novel and realistic traceback mechanisms which offer many advantages
over the existing schemes. All the three schemes take advantage of the Autonomous System
topology and consider the fact that the attacker's packets may traverse through a number of
domains under different administrative control. Most of the traceback mechanisms make wrong
assumptions that the network details of a company under an administrative control are disclosed
to the public. For security reasons, this is not the case most of the times.
The proposed schemes overcome this drawback by considering reconstruction at the inter
and intra AS levels. Hierarchical Internet Traceback (HIT) and Simple Traceback Mechanism
(STM) trace back to an attacker in two phases. In the first phase the attack originating
Autonomous System is identified while in the second phase the attacker within an AS is
identified. Both the schemes, HIT and STM, allow the victim to trace back to the attackers in a
few seconds. Their computational overhead is very low and they scale to large distributed attacks
with thousands of attackers. Fast Autonomous System Traceback allows complete attack path
reconstruction with few packets.
We use traceroute maps of real Internet topologies CAIDA's skitter to simulate DDoS
attacks and validate our design.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
1.1

Background
Distributed Denial of Service attacks are one among the most malicious attacks in the

Internet today. In a DDoS attack a myriad of compromised systems attack a target, causing it to
crash or deny service to legitimate users. DDoS attacks overwhelm the target system with data
such that the response time is slowed down or stopped altogether [1]. In order to create the
necessary traffic an attacker installs DoS daemons on a large number of systems (agents). These
agents either exploit vulnerabilities present at the victim or overload the victim with inordinate
requests. The former attack causes the victim to reboot or crash while the latter causes the victim
to utilize some of its critical resources to handle the attack traffic and deny service to legitimate
users. In short, DoS effect is achieved when the service requests interfere with the victim's
operation and make it hang, crash, reboot or perform unnecessary work.
There are two broad categories into which the defense against a DDoS attack falls: a)
Prevention of the attack from happening b) Detecting the attack traffic and reacting to it.
Proactive measures avert host based or network based attacks from compromising systems.
Some of the preventive methods include keeping software patched up, ingress/egress filtering,
source validation by using reverse turing tests, well organized networks with critical applications
spread across several servers in different subnets, a firewall to prevent unwarranted intrusion and
a demilitarized zone (DMZ) area for permission to outsiders.
Reactive measures constitute of two phases, detection and reaction. In the first phase, the
attack is identified using signature detection schemes like Intrusion Detection System and
Anomaly Detection. The second phase includes reactive methods such as adhering to the
Disaster Recovery Plans of reinstalling OS and applications on compromised systems,
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characterizing the attack traffic; filtering the malicious packets at the organization's firewall or
informing the upper tiers of the malicious attack and blocking the packets; identifying the attack
zone using trace back mechanism and informing the Autonomous System of the agents
performing the attack.
The best mitigation strategy is to stop the attack from occurring at all. However it is
impossible that proactive measures can impede every attacker. There will always exist operating
systems & applications with glitches and servers with limited resources to handle requests.
Reactive measures like traceback mechanisms play a crucial role when proactive approaches fail
to block a malicious attack. Reactive measures may be the only means to identify and shutdown
a zombie to prevent any further damage. A victim can identify an attacker solely based on the
source IP address field in a packet and if this field is spoofed then measures to block attack
traffic based on source IP address fail. Traceback mechanisms have routers mark partial
information on packets traversing towards the victim, which then utilizes this information to
reconstruct the path, the packets have taken through the internet to traverse towards it [2]. This
combats the problem of IP spoofing as the path to the attacker is identified. Even finding partial
path information would be useful because attacks could be throttled at far routers. Disregarding
the problem of finding the person responsible for the attack, if a victim is able to determine the
path of the attacking packets in near real-time, it would be much easier to quickly stop the attack
[3].
This report, presents three novel and realistic traceback schemes namely Hierarchical IP
Traceback (HIT), Fast Autonomous System Traceback (FAST) and Simple Traceback
Mechanism (STM). All the approaches employ Autonomous System Border Routers (ASBRs)
for marking as they are few in number, more powerful and have higher incentives to implement
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traceback mechanisms when compared to normal routers. HIT reconstructs to the attacker in two
phases, the first phase identifies the attack originating AS and second phase traces the attacker
within an Autonomous System. In comparison with Authenticated Marking Scheme (an existing
scheme), HIT involves lower overhead, reconstruction time, complexity and requires less
number of packets to reconstruct to the attacker. FAST uses a node append mode of marking and
requires a very few packets to reconstruct to the attack originating AS. This scheme is very
efficient for attackers at large AS path lengths. Simple Traceback Mechanism can identify the
attack originating AS in a single packet and the originating attacker in a few tens of packets. This
scheme suffers from pollution attacks. As compared to HIT and FAST, STM has lower
reconstruction time and computation overhead but suffers from pollution attacks.
1.2

Thesis Outline
This report begins with Chapter 1 on 'Literature Review' which includes sections on

recruitment of agent networks, different types of DDoS attacks, the various toolkits used to
launch these attacks over the years and the trend these attacks are likely to follow in future.
Chapter 2, 'Defense Mechanisms - Preventive and Reactive' we discuss about the various defense
mechanisms system administrators can adopt to protect their organizations against attacks. In
Chapter 4 we give a contrast and comparison of various Tracing Technologies such as ICMP
Traceback, IP Traceback, FMS, AMS & Pi. and discuss the general properties a traceback
mechanism should have. In Chapters 5, 6 & 7 we give a description of the proposed schemes,
Hierarchical Internet Traceback (HIT), Fast Internet Traceback(FAST) and Simple Traceback
Scheme (STM) respectively. In these chapters we also present the packet marking algorithms and
the reconstruction algorithms which can be deployed on the Internet routers and at the victim
respectively. In these chapters we also detail on the inferences from the experimental results. In
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Chapter 8 we describe the design of the software for the simulator. Appendices constitutes of
simulations in Perl for each algorithm.
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
The consequences of DoS attacks are catastrophic. Starting from the Morris worm that
attacked the CERT Coordination Center in late 1980s to TCP/IP SYN flood attack in 1996, DoS
programs have brought the Internet to its knees. Revenue, productivity, site performance are
highly deteriorated and increased IT expenses only add to the mounting burden. Distributed
computing and access to increased bandwidth have increased the level of sophistication causing
DoS attack to be more powerful. The year 1999 witnessed the first large scale distributed attack
(DDoS) against the IRC server at University of Minnesota [4]. The attack toolkits automate
almost all the processes allowing the DDoS attacks to compromise nodes at an exponential rate
and thus trigger large scale attacks. Trinoo, Tribal Flood Network and Stacheldraht were marked
as the weapons of choice for DDoS attacks [4]. The motive behind DDoS attacks is only
degrading to highest levels of unlawfulness. Attacks ranged from identifying loopholes and
crashing a few systems for fun and bringing down the business of companies to stealing personal
information of people. In March 2005, hackers hit California State University gaining personal
information including names and social security numbers of 59,000 people affiliated with it.
Earlier in the same year DSW shoe warehouse acknowledged stolen credit information from
more than a hundred of its stores [5]. These attacks could get more lethal in conjunction with
cyber terrorism, the use of computing resources to intimidate or coerce others. An example
cyber terrorism could be hacking into a hospital computer system and changing someone's
medicine prescription to a lethal dosage as an act of revenge [44]. Cyber terrorism could also be
the next mode of revenge, terrorists can resort after the 9/11 attack. This only shows that attacks
are getting very powerful and dangerous and that people have to take the necessary precautions.
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2.1

Recruitment of Agent Network
Having understood the varied nature of DDoS attacks it would be useful to be aware of

the whole process of a DDoS attack right from the recruitment of an agent network to the
different tools used to wage an attack, the scale of an attack and the last but not the least defense
mechanisms to fend off attackers. The following paragraph describes the process of recruitment
of an agent network.
Depending on the scale and type of attack, the attacker intends to initiate, he searches for
vulnerable hosts (hosts with high network bandwidth and poor administration), manually, semiautomatically or automatically, in a process known as scanning. Once the vulnerable nodes are
identified DoS daemons are installed on these systems. Earlier it was the installation process that
was automated, but now there are scripts to automate the search for vulnerable hosts and
installation of attack code. Examples of automated scanning tools are sscan, bots and worms.
The various stages of the DDoS attack model as shown in Figure 2.1. The program
(installed in attacking hosts) that performs the attack communicates with the communication
channel.
Attacker

Communication Channel

Attacking hosts

Victim

Figure 2.1 DDoS Attack Model
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The communication channel can be a single host (IRC server) or a set of hosts
(Handlers). The communication channel is a means for the infected hosts to declare themselves,
to provide an indirect way of communication with the attacker [7]. The IRC model and Agent
Handler model are examples of DDoS attack models with different communication channels.
In the IRC model, Figure 2.2, the communication channel is an IRC server or a set of IRC
servers. This model uses bot as the automated scanning tools. A bot is a program on a
compromised host, watching for encoded commands, like scanning a block of addresses or
inviting a person to the IRC channel, to execute on the IRC channel. Once the bot obtains a set of
vulnerable hosts they inform the attacker using botnet. The attacker creates a list of vulnerable
hosts from the set addresses obtained from all the bots. The attacker then establishes
communication channels between machines using IRC-based command to achieve an attack.
Attacker

IRC Server

IRC Server
BOT

BOT

Host

Host

Host

Host

Victim

Figure 2.2 IRC Model
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Host

Host

Thousands of people connect to an IRC server and form thousands of different chat channels. It
is impossible to identify the attack channel in such a huge number of channels and therefore the
identity of the attacker is left unknown [7].
In the Agent Handler, Figure 2.3, the communication channel consists of one or more
hosts (handlers) that the attacker has compromised. The attacker issues commands to handler
which inturn dispatches commands to the agent to launch an attack against the victim.

Attacker

Handler

Handler

Agent

Agent

Agent

Agent

Agent

Agent

Victim

Figure 2.3 A Handler/Agent Control Structure
Like bots, worms are also automated client programs that propagate from one vulnerable
host to another. Worms scan for vulnerable machines, exploit the compromised machines by
installing the attack code and execute a code (called payload) to achieve an attack. Worms spread
extremely fast because of parallel propagation pattern. The infected machines and the worm
copies swarming the internet, grow exponentially [8].
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2.2

Types of Attacks
The ultimate motive of a DDoS attack is to incapacitate a system's ability to process

requests for its legitimate users. The various forms of attack are as follows:
2.2.1

Attack of Application
Every application can handle a certain number of requests per second. Attackers target a

specific application and send packets such that this limit is reached. If the number of packets sent
to the victim is more than its request acceptance rate the server can be overloaded causing it to
hang or crash. This causes a denial of service to legitimate users.
Heavy provisioning, in the form of ample server and network capacity, can protect
against application attack but can't guarantee immunity. Reacting to this kind of an attack by
directing the traffic to a black hole or a sink hole might prevent the host from crashing but it
doesn't rule out the possibility of denying service to legitimate users. There are not many
defenses that can protect a victim against this attack. Reactive schemes such as traceback
mechanisms can help identify the attack originating system and have it shut down.
2.2.2

Attack of Protocol
There are many vulnerabilities that exist in protocols. Attackers make use of these

loopholes to launch a DDoS attack. One such vulnerability is with the transport layer protocol Transmission Control Protocol (TCP). This protocol is responsible for the reliable transmission
of packets between end systems. Any application that runs on a TCP protocol synchronizes
session parameters between the server and client in 3 phases as shown in Figure 2.4 [9]. In the
first phase the client sends a TCP/SYN packet requesting a service, to the server. In the SYN
packet header the client provides a unique per connection number and a sequence number that
keeps track of the amount and order of the data, sent by the client. Once the server receives the
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SYN packet it allocates a TCB, transmission control block, storing information about the client.
The server then sends a SYN ACK packet acknowledging the client of the service request it
received and granting the service it requested. The packet header of the SYN ACK packet
contains the server's initial sequence number. The client allocates a TCB and completes the
opening of the connection by sending an ACK packet back to the server.

Figure 2.4 Opening of TCP connection: Three-way Handshake
The vulnerability an attacker exploits here is the allocation of TCB by the server before
the client commits any of its resources. Figure 2.5 shows the handshake between the server and
client, when the server is under an attack. If the server doesn't receive any ACK packet from the
client it closes the connection after timeout expires. The resources of the server are tied up till it
receives an ACK packet from the client. If the attacker identifies an open port and sends small
number of requests with spoofed addresses before the timeout expires, the server will wait for
10

ACK from the spoofed clients and allocate memory for each of its spoofed clients [6]. In the
process the victim exhausts its memory and crashes hence denying service to legitimate users. In
another version of TCP SYN flooding the attacker can send enormous packets to random ports
rendering the network resources useless rather than the buffer space.

Figure 2.5 Handshake under an Attack
Protocol attacks target the asymmetry inherent in certain protocols by requiring the server
to allocate its resources while sparing the client of its resources. Change in protocol
specifications can be a solution but this will require all the systems to change their settings.
Therefore, this doesn't seem like a feasible solution. The other solutions would be to create
protocol patches that balance the asymmetry by requiring the clients to provide a proof of work
or resource allocation through TCP SYN cookies and RST cookies, allocate micro blocks instead
of the complete connection block for the client [9].
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2.2.3

Attack of Resources
An attacker targets resources like the CPU cycles, computing power, router switching

capacity & infrastructure to launch a DDoS attack. Requests, which involve huge mathematical
calculations or vulnerable hash functions, require more CPU cycles as compared to the ordinary
applications. A few requests can overwhelm the server rendering it incapable of processing
legitimate requests. Many types of DDoS attacks are more or less overlapping. For example this
attack can also fall in the attack of application category.
Router switching capacity is another resource attack, which targets at increasing the size
of the routing tables with unimportant data and at times it leaves no room for critical entries. The
router has to parse more information to forward packets to their destination. This causes delays
in packet forwarding and sometimes packets get dropped before reaching their destination. The
performance of routers is adversely affected due to such attacks.
Attack of infrastructure resources, exploits the network design of an organization. In a
poorly designed network all the servers belong to the same sub network and an attack targeting
routers, handling the subnet can easily cripple all the servers in that subnet. Proper design of the
network, redundancy of information (backup servers & geographically distributed servers) and
paths can be a solution.
2.2.4 Exploiting a Vulnerability
Attackers exploit vulnerabilities at the victim with well crafted packets. An improper
handling of these packets disrupts the proper functioning of the victim. A well known
vulnerability attack, Tear drop attack, exploits the markings in the fragmentation field of the IP
header. When a router receives an IP packet that is too large for the network to which the packet
is being forwarded, IP fragments the packet into smaller size packets to accommodate in the
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network. At the receiving end the packets are reassembled into the original payload. The packet
header has a fragmentation field, which keeps track of the order of the fragmented packets. If this
field is manipulated for any two fragmented packets, reassembly of the packets at the victim
causes a hang or crash of the system. Different versions of this attack exist with the fragments
that indicate small overlap, a negative offset and different padding size or larger offset than the
size of the IP header leading to the attacks Teardrop, bonk, boink and newtear[10].
For applications which run on TCP, a reliable protocol, which can discard the packet and
request for the packet to be resent, will have a patch for this loophole but applications which run
on unreliable protocols like UPD are still open to exploit.
In SSping attack, a variant of "Ping of Death" attack, a packet size greater than 65536
octets (Maximum size of a TCP/IP packet) sent to a victim will force it to halt. Land attack is
another example of vulnerability attack exploiting the sources and destination address fields in
an IP packet [10]. Unlike flooding attacks, vulnerability attacks become ineffective once a patch
for these attacks has been developed.
2.2.5 Pure Flooding
In this attack, the intruder floods the victim with inordinate service requests. A multitude
of illegitimate requests can consume many of the critical resources at the victim, rendering the
victim incapable of processing legitimate requests.
As such there are no preventive measures against this attack. Reactive measures at the
victim include detection and characterization of the attack traffic followed by contacting the ISP
to filter, rate limit and direct the traffic to a black hole or sink hole. In the process of filtering
packets which saves the ISP's and victim's resources the requests sent from legitimate users can
also be denied and the motive of the flood attack is accomplished.
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As most applications run on TCP traffic, UDP traffic can be filtered reducing the
possibility of resources utilization by the UDP traffic. Smurf & Fraggle are two other flooding
attacks, which use IP spoofing to swamp the network bandwidth. This type of an attack
constitutes of three parties, the attacker, the intermediary (the broadcast address to which packets
are sent) and the victim (the spoofed IP address). An attacker sends ICMP echo requests traffic
to the intermediary address using a spoofed source address of a victim. This causes every
machine on the broadcast network to receive the reply and respond back to the source address
that was forged by the attacker [27]. The attacker can spoof a set of IPs and cause the
intermediary systems to respond to the request causing the network to be swamped. Because the
source address on the packets was forged, all the replies go back to the source address that was
specified, which now becomes the victim’s machine.
2.3

Attack Toolkits
An attack toolkit is a tool used to launch DDoS attacks using the above mentioned

methods. It is a piece of code that is built into an easily usable package for launching attacks.
Some attackers are sophisticated to originate their own attack code while most of them use
existing codes. Moreover attackers write scripts to automate the installation process and this
allows unsophisticated users to become DDoS perpetrators in a short time. Automation leads to
widespread attacks thus increasing the intensity of destruction caused.
Early DoS attack technology involved simple tools that generated and sent packets from a
single source aimed at a single destination. Over time, tools evolved to execute single source
attacks against multiple targets, multiple source attacks against single targets, and multiple
source attacks against multiple targets [10].
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There exists a constant race between the attackers and the defenders. As soon as
defenders come up with defense mechanisms, attackers find ways to bypass these defenses.
Advanced toolkits are emerging to support the motivation behind every DDoS attack. Over the
years attacks ranged from large scale UDP, TCP flooding with tools like Trinoo, Stacheldraht &
Tribal Flood Network to financially motivated attacks with tools like Agobot and Phabot.
The trend of attack strategies is becoming more and more daunting as the sophistication
of the tools being employed is scaling upwards. Table 2.1 gives a chronological order of the
main tools and their attack methods.
Table 2.1 DDoS Tools and Flooding or Attack Methods
TOOLS

FLOODING OR ATTACK METHOD

Trin00

UDP

Tribal Flood Network

UDP, ICMP, SYN, Smurf

Stacheldracht and Varients

UDP, ICMP, SYN, Smurf

TFN 2K

UDP, ICMP, SYN, Smurf

Shaft

UDP, ICMP, SYN, Combo

MStream

Stream(ACK)

Trinity, Trinity V3

UDP,SYN,RST, Random Flag, ACK, Fragment

Phabot,Agobot

UPD, ICMP, Targa,

The following sections give a brief overview of the trends associated with the popular
DDoS attacks.
2.3.1

Trin00
Trin00 was one of the prominent tools used to attack against the IRC server at University
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of Minnesota in November, 1999. With IRC clients all over the globe to launch coordinated UDP
flood denial of service attacks, all the resources got locked up and service was denied to all the
legitimate users for days. The University counted around 2,500 attacking hosts, and that was an
underestimate as the logs were not able to keep up with the attack [11].
Trinoo uses handler/agent architecture, with Trinoo residing in the agents and the handler
commanding the agents to launch the attack. The following are the ports used for Trinoo attack.
Attacker - Handler destination port 27665/tcp
Handler - Agent destination port 27444/udp
Agent - Victims randomized destination ports
Agent - Handler destination port 31335/udp
All the communications with handler on port 27665/tcp require a password and all those
on port 274444/udp require the UDP packets to contain the string "l44". The source address of
trin00 packets is not spoofed; therefore finding the agent is not hard except that there will be
many of them [12].
2.3.2

Tribe Flood Network (TFN)
TFN uses a similar handler/agent model as in trin00. TFN uses ICMP (Internet Control

Message Protocol) echo reply packets with 16 bit binary values embedded in the ID field, and
any arguments embedded in the data portion of the packet. The binary values, which are
definable at compile time represent instructions between the handler and agent. The instructions
when decoded can support several denials of service attacks like SYN floods, UDP floods, ICMP
floods, and smurfing. For example the code 345 represents SYN flood attack. The TFN runs at
the root therefore the source address can be spoofed making identification of the attackers even
harder [12], [13].
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2.3.3

Tribe Flood Network 2000 (TFN2K)
TFN2K appeared in December 1999 and was an improved version of the TFN attack tool.

It includes a strong encryption (CAST-256) algorithm for control packets. TFN2K was designed
to be compatible with almost all the operating systems including Linux, Solaris, Unix &
Windows [14]. The communication between the handler and agent is done on randomly chosen
protocols (TCP, UDP, ICMP) so that no recognizable pattern can be obtained. Therefore the
packets pass through most of the filtering mechanisms. The communication is one way with no
acknowledgments sent back to the handler by the TFK2N agent leaving no trace of the handler.
The handler sends around 20 commands assuming atleast one command would have been
received by the agent. TF2KN voids the concept on which the certain scan tools are built to
identify the handler as the executables are stored as binaries in the handler. The scan tools detect
certain matching string patterns to determine an attack agent. But with binaries there is string
pattern matching tool is lacking. In the agents the binaries are extracted to executables and the
pattern matching strings can be found.
In addition to flooding TFN2K can also attack by sending invalid packets, which includes
invalid offset, protocol, packet size, header values, options, offsets, tcp segments, and routing
flags [47]. This kind of an attack is called Targa3 attack. Enough malformed packets can cause
the system to crash.
2.3.4 Stacheldraht
This attack toolkit appeared during the same time as Trinoo and TFN. Stacheldraht
combines the features of the two. Like TFN it can spoof the source address. It also uses
encrypted communication between handler and agent and provides for automatic updates. With
the update feature Stacheldraht can automatically replace agents with new versions and start
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them. It uses TCP and ICMP on the following ports as default:
Attacker to handler: 16660/Tcp
Handler to and from agent: 65000/Tcp, ICMP ECHO_REPLY
The attacks performed by Stacheldraft are UDP flood, TCP SYN flood, ICMP Echo flood and
smurf attacks. Many strings could be used in identifying the binaries in the file system. The
NIPC tools would be effective in discovering these agents. However, if the binaries get
compressed, this technique will not be successful [14]. Stacheldraht is far more difficult to
prevent as it uses ICMP protocol for its communication. Through years Stacheldraht agent came
up with varied version known as t0rnkit toolkit and Ramen worm.
2.3.5

Shaft
Shaft is another attack tool that uses a combination of features similar to Trinoo, TFN,

Stacheldraht. The shaft network is made up of one or more handler programs and a large set of
agents, which gives the ability to switch handlers and agent ports on the fly making it difficult to
filter packets. The following are the ports it uses:
Attacker to handler: 20432/tcp
Handler to agent: 18753/udp
Daemon to handler: 20433/udp [15].
Shaft uses 'ticket' mechanism for keeping track of agents. Both password and ticket
numbers have to match for the agent to execute a request. Agents can launch UPD flood, TCP
SYN flood & ICMP flood attack. The flood occurs in bursts of 100 packets/host (This number is
hard coded) with the source port and address randomized. The attacker can choose the duration,
size of the packets and type of flooding attack towards the victim. Handlers have special
command to obtain statistics on the attack traffic generated by each agent. This allows the
attacker to keep track of the yield generated by the DDoS attack [16].
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2.3.6

Mstream
Mstream is another attack tool which is less sophisticated when compared with other

tools. The source code of this attack tool was recovered in its developmental stages with
numerous bugs. Mstream agent was discovered in April 2000 on a compromised Linux machine
in a major university. This tool slows down the machine by using up CPU cycles and eats up the
network bandwidth. It generates a flood of TCP packets with ACK bit set. Handlers can be
controlled remotely by one or more attackers using password protected interactive login. The
communication between all the components in the attack can be changed at compile time. The
handler does not require root privileges, but can login as a regular user on a Unix system to
command the agents. The agent crafts the headers for forged packets and thus requires
administrative privileges to perform the attack. The default ports are
Attacker to handler: 6723/tcp
Handler to agent: 9325/udp
Daemon to handler: 7983/udp
The handler expects commands to be contained entirely in the payload of the packet.
Therefore the attacker can't use remote login like telnet to control the handlers. Like Trinoo,
communication between handler and agent is accomplished through UDP datagrams [17].
2.3.7

Trinity
Trinity is the first DDoS tool that is controlled via IRC (Internet Relay Chat). After a

machine is compromised by a Trinity agent it joins a specified IRC channel and waits for
commands from the handler. This facilitates for a massive flood attack against a target machine.
Trinity is capable of launching several types of attacks including UDP, IP fragment, TCP SYN,
TCP ACK and other floods. Presently there are eight variants of Trinity attack found on Internet
Relay Channels [45].
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2.3.8

Agobot
Agobot a descendent of Phatbot was widely used in 2003 and 2004. It is a blended threat

which can perform a varied set of attacks for which it is called "Swiss army knife".

It

implements two types of SYN floods UPD flood and ICMP flood, the Targa flood (which
includes random IP protocol, fragmentation and fragment offset values and spoofed source
address), the wonk flood (one SYN packet, followed by 1023 ACK packets) and a recursive
HTTP GET flood. This HTTP flood is difficult to obviate by filtering because the attack traffic
pattern resembles the normal traffic pattern [18].
2.4

Attack Worms

2.4.1 Code Red
It is a self replicating malicious code that exploits a known vulnerability, buffer overflow
in Microsoft Internet Information Server (IIS) Indexing Service DLL. The worm had a world
wide impact in summer 2001, with 359,000 machines infected in 14 hours [19]. The Code Red
worm attempts to connect to TCP port 80 on a randomly chosen host assuming that a web server
will be found. Upon a successful connection to port 80, the attacking host sends a crafted HTTP
GET request to the victim, attempting to exploit a buffer overflow in the Indexing Service.
Systems not running IIS, but with a HTTP (HyperText Transfer Protocol) server listening on
TCP port 80 will probably accept the HTTP request, return with an "HTTP 400 Bad Request"
message, and potentially log this request in an access log. A packet-flooding DoS attack will be
launched against a specific IP address embedded in the code [20]. If the exploit is successful, the
worm begins executing on the victim host.
Code red 2, a disruptive version of code red, preferentially probed for machines on the
same subnet and nearby subnets. As a result, once a machine within a corporate firewall is
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infected, it would quickly probe every machine within the firewall and infect virtually the entire
network [21].
2.4.2

Nimda Worm
The Nimda worm has the potential to affect both user workstations (clients) running

Windows 95, 98, ME, NT, or 2000 and servers running Windows NT or 2000. End-users can get
infected by either opening an e-mail attachment called README.EXE or by surfing on an
infected web site, which might offer the user to download README.EXE. After the end-user
has executed the file, the worm will continue to spread in two different ways. First it will send
itself out via e-mails directed to addresses found from users e-mail inbox. Secondly it will start
to scan random Internet addresses trying to locate vulnerable IIS web servers [21]. The actual
spreading of Nimda can be split to four parts: Infecting files, Mass mailing, Web worm and LAN
propagation as seen in Figure 2.6

Figure 2.6 Spreading of Nimda Worm
Nimda is the first worm to modify existing web sites to start offering infected files for
download. Also it is the first worm to use normal end user machines to scan for vulnerable web
sites. Other worms which spread at such a rapid rate were vbs.loveletter worm and the
w32.bugbear worm. These worms took the major anti-virus manufacturers off-guard.
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2.5

Reason Why DDoS Attacks Are so Easy to Implement
•

Dependence on Internet
Internet has become a vital part of human life. Businesses like Ebay, Amazon and Netflix
rely heavily on online transactions. Any infliction on the business servers can cause a
huge revenue loss to such companies. Frequent attacks can damage a site's reputation and
ward off customers and investors. Public network is the easiest & most accessible
platform for the invaders to launch attacks to bring down any victim to its knees.

•

Availability & Simplicity
DDoS tools are available at large and can be easily downloaded. Automation of
processes like scanning for vulnerable hosts, installing agents and launching an attack
allows a novice to launch flood attacks with just a few commands. Attack toolkits are
exceedingly simple to use and some of them have been here for years. Still, they generate
effective attacks with little or no tweaking.

•

Security Pitfalls
Mostly, systems are connected to the internet via a public network. It is easy for attackers
to access such machines and install vulnerability scanners. Most of these systems can be
targeted as agents, to launch DDoS attacks because of their ineffective security measures.
Systems should be setup for regular updates to fix patches, latest antivirus/anti-spyware
software and a firewall to prevent unauthorized access.

•

IP Spoofing
IP spoofing is an easy technique for attackers to hide their identity. The IP address of the
source or destination field in the packet can be tampered, causing the victim to assume
the origin of the attack traffic to be legitimate. An attack launched can't be traced back as
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the origin is spoofed. The tremendous growth in the number of systems connected to the
internet has increased utility of IP spoofing. As such prevention of IP spoofing is not
possible but approaches like ingress filtering and egress filtering minimize DDoS attacks.
IP spoofing coupled with varied attack patterns and multitude of machines has made
DDoS attacks extremely powerful.
•

Multitude of Agent Machines
With millions of computers connected to the internet and this number rising rapidly, the
probability that the attacker finds novice internet users is high, increasing the strength of
a DDoS attack. With so many agents, the attacker can vary his attack by deploying
subsets of agents at a time, varying strategies or sending a few packets at a time. A few
packets beat the concept of trace back and even if 10,000 machine identities are known, it
is highly impossible to stop these sources. The solution would be to have secure systems
preventing agents from being installed. With the existing internet layout, this seems too
far a practical solution. Even if companies come up with solutions it will not be in the
near future that systems will be impervious to attacks.

•

Limited Resources
Every system has limited resources and the attackers target these resources by
overwhelming them with the high-volumes traffic. CPU cycles, network bandwidth and
power are a few of the resources that are targeted. If legitimate traffic could be discerned
from attack traffic then controlled traffic would not swamp the limited resources.

•

Legitimate or Illegitimate Traffic
Unlike the vulnerability attacks where the packets have to be crafted (Targa3, worms) to
launch an attack, flooding attacks can compromise a large number of systems with
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volumes of traffic. As this traffic behaves like legitimate traffic, the filtering process
becomes extremely difficult.
•

Internet Topology
The current internet topology uses a Hub & Spoke with hubs carrying large volumes of
traffic. If these hubs are taken down by an attack there will be a devastating effect on the
global connectivity.
Summarizing all the aforementioned reasons we have, almost all the businesses
rely heavily on internet. "Black hats" have an abundance of tools (easily available and
automated) and accomplices (agents) to originate an attack and bring these companies
down. A sufficient volume of attack with IP spoofing and a mixture of attack pattern can
beat the filtering mechanisms and leave the victims swamped.

2.6

DDoS Defense Hurdles
•

Distributed Response
The challenges we are facing today is because of the vast nature of the distributed
network. DDoS attacks utilize the distributed nature of the internet to launch an attack.
With thousands of systems distributed all over the world to generate an attack, a response
system to DDoS attack should be distributed and possibly coordinated. Since internet is
administered in a distributed manner, a wide range deployment of a response system is
highly unlikely.

•

Lack of Detailed Attack Information
It is believed that disclosure of any DDoS attack will damage the reputation of a
company. Therefore many occurrences of DDoS attacks are not reported. Lack of
appropriate information prevents researchers from knowing the current trend of attacks.
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Information like the kind of attack, the number of agents and the time for which the
attack persisted is very crucial for developing defense mechanisms.
•

Lack of Defense System Benchmarks
Presently there is no standardized procedure to determine the merits of any mechanism
proposed by companies.

2.7

Case Study of IPremier
The following is a case study of a web-based commerce company, IPremier, which

closed down after a DDoS attack was launched against it. A review on this case study will leave
us with a situation which requires us to decide the appropriate defense mechanism against an
attack.
IPremier was a venture started by two students in 1994, in Washington, Seattle. The
company was one of the top two retail businesses selling luxury, rare and vintage goods on web.
It was one of the few profitable entities in the so-called "new economy". Qdata, was the
company in charge of providing internet security services including firewall service, filtering and
blocking packets & monitoring traffic for IPremier. In the year 2003, a DDoS attack at a rate of
one email/sec was launched against IPremier. A SYN flood attack lasted for an hour
incapacitating the servers all the while. Qdata was not up to date with the software patches and
intrusion detection signatures. It also couldn't maintain a proper log of the attack packets and
hence was not able to locate the attackers.
With an intention to obtain the log files to trace back to the source of the attack IPremier
left the attacked ports open for more than a week. The attacker behaved as normal traffic and
installed an agent on the server through the port. This agent was remotely commanded to launch
Distributed Denial of Service attacks against the competitors of IPremier. When the competitors
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realized that they were being attacked by IPremeier, they believed that IPremeier had launched
the attack as the source address of the attack packets was the IPremeier server. The competitor
filed a case against IPremeier and had it shut down forever. A company that was at its pinnacle
crashed for making an improper decision. It left the server ports unsecured with an urge to find
the attacker.
IPremeier had two options to handle the attack situation. The company adopted reactive
measures and left its ports unsecured with an intention to traceback the attacker. It could have
adopted preventive measures and updated its security system instead of having left loopholes for
another attack. For obvious reasons prevention would have been an ideal option but this is not
always the case. Threre will always exist glitches in applications, protocols and operating
systems which can be exploited to launch an attack
Rate limiting, packet filtering, and tweaking software parameters can in some cases, help
limit the impact of DoS attacks, but usually only at points where the DoS attack is consuming
fewer resources than are available. The open, interconnected nature of the internet and its
underlying protocols, will always have scope for exploits and there is every possibility that
preventive measures will fail. If an attack can't be prevented, there has to be an alternate
countermeasure, one can resort to. In many cases, the only defense is a reactive one. Reactive
measures help to locate the systems where the agent is installed. Once the attack traffic is
detected and characterized at the victim, reactive measures should be taken at the earliest. Higher
tiers can be asked to block unwanted traffic and with their cooperation the source of attack traffic
can be tracked and shut down.
With the given explanation it is clear that an optimal mix of the preventive and reactive
measures can be the best bet against a DDoS attack. The following chapter 'DEFENSE
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AGAINST DDoS ATTACKS: Preventive & Reactive' gives an insight on the existing preventive
& reactive measures against DDoS attacks.

27

CHAPTER 3: DEFENSE AGAINST DDOS ATTACKS: PREVENTIVE AND
REACTIVE
There are two types of defense mechanisms against DDoS attacks: preventive and
reactive. Preventive/Proactive approaches include all measures to avert an attack from
happening. Reactive approaches are those procedures an organization adheres to once it
discovers that some of its systems have been compromised [22]. Preventive and reactive
measures are not mutually exclusive. An adequate allocation of resources for both the
mechanisms is helpful in building a robust infrastructure for an organization.
Following are some preventive measures that can improve the security of systems and
make it difficult for an attacker to channel a DDoS attack through them. It is of vital importance
that these suggestions be implemented to protect the systems in an organization.
3.1

System Administrators
•

Updates
Updates are very crucial to correct flaws existing in an OS or other applications. Most
vendors put out security fixes at a rapid rate, therefore applying the latest patches
provides for a more secure system. These patches minimize a vulnerability attack but not
a flood attack. A flood attack can be minimized by ensuring a robust design of an
organization.

•

AntiVirus/Antispyware Software Updates
Signatures are patterns against which antivirus and antispyware programs match the files
on the disk to identify as a virus, worm or trojan. Tweaking an existing virus can create a
new version of the virus which can be left unidentified without the updates of antivirus
softwares.

28

•

Block Incoming Packets Addressed to the Broadcast Address
In certain situations, a node in a network may require to send a broadcast message to its
peers but there is no legitimate reason for an external device to send a broadcast message
to every node on the network unless and until it wants to swamp the resources of the
network through an IP directed broadcast, Smurf attack. Therefore Cisco routers, have an
option to configure on every port of the router a 'no ip directed broadcast'. With this
option enabled, the directed broadcast is routed through the network as a unicast packet
until it arrives at the target subnet, where it is converted into a link-layer broadcast. The
‘no ip directed-broadcast’ command is the default in Cisco IOS software version 12.0 and
later [21].

•

Firewall
A firewall examines packets passing to a computer or network and discards them if they
do not meet certain criteria. Depending on the position of the firewall, access lists for
filtering the packets are determined. The four types of firewall methods include Packet
filtering, Circuit level gateways, Application level gateway and Stateful Inspection. In
packet filtering, packets are filtered based on the ip address and port numbers. Known
ports on which previous attacks have been performed should be blocked. Ports like the
IRC port which has been associated with DDoS attacks and reserved IP address or Private
IP address which will never run on public network should be blocked. New attacks which
use a new set of port numbers, have to be detected first to be blocked. With tools for
processor utilization or Network I/O performance and traffic monitoring, the statistics of
attack traffic can be determined and excessive traffic can be blocked. In the Stateful
inspection firewall method a connection is established only if the request is initiated from
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within a network. This way if systems are scanned for vulnerabilities, only the address of
the firewall is shown up and an intruder can not remotely access any system to install an
agent or malware.
•

Ingress & Egress Filtering
Ingress filtering is a process of filtering inbound traffic. The ingress router of an ISP is
connected to a company's network to filter data entering it allowing attack traffic to be
filtered at a higher tier. Egress filtering is a process of filtering outbound traffic and it
controls the data leaving a network. Egress filtering is achieved by setting outbound
filters on the egress router to ensure that only assigned IP address space leaves the
network. Therefore systems within the network with egress filtering can't launch an
attack by IP spoofing [45].
This kind of filtering is provided on the CISCO routers using access lists. Egress filtering
is company dependent; hence a company should decide for itself what traffic would
require leaving the intranet of the company. Based on the company's requirements routers
should be configured to provide for egress filtering [21].

•

Demilitarized Zone (DMZ)
"A DMZ is a small subnetwork that sits between a trusted internal network, such as a
corporate private LAN, and an untrusted external network, such as the public internet"
[23]. Typically DMZ contains HTTP servers, FTP servers, SMTP servers & DNS servers
which can be accessed by public traffic. Both external and internal machines can access
servers in the DMZ. DMZs allow internal machines initiate requests outbound to the
DMZ which in-turn responds, forwards or re-issues the request to the public as a proxy
server but the LAN firewall prevents DMZ from initiating inbound traffic. DMZ is the
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only zone public can access, they can't access the network of the company directly hence
the internal servers are safe. In the event that an outside user penetrated the DMZ host's
security, the Web pages might be corrupted but no other company information would be
exposed [24].
•

Unnecessary Services
Services are programs that run when the computer starts up and continues to run as they
aid the operating system in functionality. There are many services that load and are not
needed which take up memory space and CPU time. Disabling such services free up
system resources and speed up the overall performance of a computer. These services are
frequently the target of attempts to compromise and deny service to the machine.

3.2

Resource Distribution within an Organization
•

Network Organization
A well organized network will not have bottlenecks that can be easily targeted. It will
have all critical applications across several servers distributed throughout the network in
different subnetworks and connected to the internet via different ISPs. The attacker has to
overwhelm all the servers to launch a denial service attack. Since critical applications are
spread throughout the network, servers affected by the attack can be isolated and replaced
with a robust system without loss of service. The separation of critical services from
noncritical services can be performed on many levels. Following is an example of the
distribution of resources within an organization [25].
- Separating public services from private services.
- Dividing n-tier architectures into their components: web, applications and database
servers.
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- Using single-purpose servers for each service (SMTP, HTTP, FTP, DNS and others)
- Splitting Internet, extranet and intranet services.
•

Proof of Work
Asymmetric protocols consume more resources on the server side than on client side.
These protocols are highly vulnerable as they require the server to allocate its resources
without the client having to allocate any of its resources to furnish a request. The
identification of the client is spoofed and attacker generates a large number of requests to
tie up the servers resources rendering its services incapable for legitimate clients. An
approach to protect against such attacks is to generate an asymmetry in favor of the
server, requiring the client to allocate its resources before the request is granted. The
server requires a proof of work from the client. A commonly used approach is to send
the client cryptographic puzzles to solve which take up a fair amount of time and
resources of the client. Verifying the answer doesn't require a lot of resource allocation
on the server side. The cryptographic puzzles are not onerous for the clients to solve
or notice but it definitely reduces the degree of a DDoS attack. A DDoS attack is slowed
down drastically for illegitimate users to issue enough requests to cause a flood attack.
This scheme works best for a small or medium scale DDoS attack [6].

•

Honeypots
Honeypots are fake computer systems that are used to collect data on intruders. A
honeypot, loaded with fake information, appears to the hacker to be a legitimate machine.
While it appears to contain operating system vulnerabilities that make it an attractive
target for hackers, it actually prevents access to valuable data, administrative controls and
other computers [26].
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3.3.
•

Detection Mechanisms
Intrusion Detection System
Intrusion detection is a first line of defense for a company's systems which detect
unauthorized access attempts. There are two general types of intrusion detection systems
(IDSs): network-based and host-based. A network-based IDS is a passive device that sits
on the network and sniffs all packets crossing a given network segment. By looking at the
packets, it looks for signatures that indicate a possible attack and sets off alarms on
questionable behaviors. When it observes an event, IDS can send pages, email messages,
take action to stop the event and record it for future forensic analysis. A host-based IDS
runs on an individual server and actively reviews the audit log looking for possible
indications of an attack. It also monitors key system files for evidence of tampering. It
does not leave a network vulnerable between the moment of intrusion detection and the
moment of consequential response [27].
Most IDSs are built on two general technologies: pattern matching and anomaly
detection. Pattern matching technologies have a database of signatures of known attacks.
When it finds packets that have a given pattern it sets off an alarm. Anomaly detection
systems determine what ‘normal’ traffic for a network is and any traffic that does not fit
within the norm is flagged as suspicious [27].

•

Tuning System Parameters
With all the tools in place to hamper a DDoS attack, the victim should have provisions to
detect the hoard of illegitimate packets hammering the perimeter of a network. Network
traffic monitoring tools, CPU utilization tools and Network performance tools can come
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handy to analyze the statistics by comparing with a model of normal traffic and block the
traffic from disrupting the services or exploiting vulnerability [6].
•

Processor Utilization
Programs like ps, top, netstat, vmstat, are useful for checking processor utilization. These
programs help to understand the CPU utilization for an application. If an application
consumes a high amount of CPU time (90%), there is every possibility that a vulnerable
application is being targeted. With a model of normal utilization it can be easy to
determine if it was an attack.

•

Disk I/O Performance
vmstat, iostat and top are some useful programs which indicate the disk I/O performance
of a system. If disk- monitoring programs, as iostat, infer high disk activity as compared
to a model of normal disk activity, then it can be assumed that a vulnerable application is
under attack.

•

Server Processes
Web Servers typically have one process for listening to requests and many child
processes to handle actual HTTP requests. If there is a very high rate of incoming
requests, the number of processes should be increased to prevent overloading of the
existing processes. Programs like top, ps, and netstat help to check overloading of the
server processes.

•

Muti-Router Traffic Grapher (MRTG)
"MRTG is a public domain package for producing graphs of various router statistics via
a web page". It maps the inbound and outbound data throughput rates on the device it is
polling. It also monitors CPU utilization of the device it is polling. MRTG gives a visual
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representation of the traffic on the network. Attack graph is indicated by spikes in the
graphs which can be compared to a model of normal traffic throughput to identify an
attack. Any layman can find this simpler than understanding jargon of the output for
command line programs like ps and top [28].
Once the attack has been detected the victim should resort to either contacting its ISP to
filter the attack traffic or identifying the attacker through traceback mechanisms. A comparison
of various traceback mechanisms is discussed in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 4: COMPARISON AND CONTRAST OF VARIOUS
TRACEBACK SCHEMES
DDoS attacks have become highly prevalent recently due to their intractability and
relative ease of execution [3]. Because of IP spoofing, the origin of the attack packets is forged
to an incorrect address causing traceback to the origin impossible. Traceback mechanisms form a
critical part of the defense against DDoS attacks. These mechanisms don't rely on the source
address of the packets but on the path through which the packets have traversed which makes it
possible to get closer to the origin of the attack. By following the stream of packets from router
to router within the network it is possible to trace back and locate the particular source that might
be conducting an attack. Figure 4.1 shows the Internet topology with attack traffic being represen
ted by an arrow and the trace back path from the victim to the attacker by a dotted line.
Once the agent computer or the attacker itself is identified, the attack can be stopped easily and
necessary legal actions can be taken against it. Even finding out partial path information would
be useful because attacks could be throttled at far routers [3].

User
User

Internet

IP traffic
AS

AS

AS

AS

Attacker

Figure 4.1 Internet Topology
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Victim

The hierarchical attacking structure that detaches the control traffic from the attacking
traffic effectively hides attackers even if the zombie computers are identified. Most of the
methods are very limited because it is necessary to have access to all routers along the path from
victim to attacker, and this is often not the case. The attacker’s packets may be traversing a
number of domains under different administrative control. So, it is necessary to contact other
network administrators, who have other demands of their time and may not be able to respond to
an attack against a target for which they are not responsible [29].
A number of recent studies have been carried to solve the IP traceback problem. Table 4.1
lists desired general properties of a traceback mechanism
Table 4.1 Comparison of various Traceback Mechanisms
Mechanism

Legacy

Network

Router

Number of

Routers

Overhead

Overhead

packets

Methodology

Scalability

FMS

Marking

No

Low

Moderate

High

No

AMS

Marking

No

Low

Low

High

Yes

iTrace

Out-of-band Marking

No

Low

Low

High

Yes

Algebraic

Marking

Yes

Low

Low

Very high

No

SPIE

Logging

No

Medium

Very High

Very low

Yes

FIT

Marking

Yes

Low

Low

Low

Yes

Hybrid IP

Marking and Logging

No

Low

Moderate

Low

Yes

Marking and Logging

Yes

Low

Moderate

Moderate

No

PPPM

Marking and Logging

No

Low

Moderate

Moderate

No

Topology-based

Deterministic Marking

No

Low

High

Moderate

No

Goodrich

Marking

Yes

Low

Low

High

No

Traceback
Distributed
Link-List
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4.1

Related Work
Researchers have proposed various schemes to address the IP traceback problem. In this

section, we identify the characteristics of a good traceback mechanism and we argue why
previously proposed mechanisms do not achieve one or more of them.
•

Incremental Deployment: A traceback mechanism should function even when only
partially deployed across routers in the Internet. If a traceback algorithm does not provide
benefits for incremental deployment, an ISP would have no incentive to start deployment.
For various administrative and technical reasons, not all routers might be willing to
participate in the traceback mechanism. Even if most of the routers are willing, it is
unrealistic to assume that all routers will start implementing the mechanism at the same
time. It is more realistic that initially only few routers participate and slowly others start
participating. Unfortunately, neither edge marking mechanisms nor logging schemes
provide strong properties for incremental deployment [30].

•

Few Packets: Because of highly distributed nature of DDoS attacks, with each attacker
sending only a few packets, a massive attack can be launched. Hence, complete traceback
using only a small number of packets is especially useful for forensics. So far, only the
SPIE mechanism enables single-packet traceback, and all other traceback approaches
require on the order of thousands [3], [31, 32, 33] or tens of thousands of packets.

•

Router Overhead: The changes needed at the routers and router overhead need to be
minimal. If a traceback mechanism only requires a minimal hardware change and has a
negligible overhead for packet forwarding, it is more likely to be accepted by router
manufacturers and eventually by the ISPs. Probabilistic packet marking techniques
impose much lesser overhead on routers than logging mechanisms.
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•

Scalability: Scalability in terms of the number of attackers and in terms of high link
speed is essential. However, both PPM and logging traceback schemes suffer from
scalability problems.

•

Reconstruction Complexity: The time taken to reconstruct the attack graph should be
small. Until the reconstruction is done the network and the victim will be under attack.
Hence, a mechanism that only needs few packets, but lot of time to reconstruct might not
be desirable.

•

Robustness: A traceback mechanism is robust if it has very low rate of false negatives
and false positives even in presence of large number of attackers.

4.2

Design Motivation
An Autonomous System (AS) is a group of IP networks operated by one or more network

operator(s), which has a single and clearly defined external routing policy. The classic definition
of an Autonomous System is a set of routers under a single technical administration, using an
IGP (Interior Gateway Protocol) and common metrics to route packets within the AS, and using
an exterior gateway protocol to route packets to other ASes. An Autonomous System Number
(ASN) is a globally unique number in the Internet to identify an AS. An ASN is used in both the
exchange of exterior routing information between neighboring ASes and as an identifier of the
AS itself in the global Internet. AS numbers are 16-bit integers, assigned and managed by
Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) [34].
Autonomous System Border Routers (ASBRs) are connected to more than one AS, to
exchange routing information with routers in other ASes. ASBRs advertise the exchanged
external routing information throughout their ASes. The traffic to/from an ASBR is controlled by
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its ASBRs. Any traffic originating from (to) an AS to (from) a node outside the AS has to pass
through an ASBR of the AS.
4.2.1
•

Marking with AS Numbers Has the Following Advantage

The number of ASes is far less than the number of routers in the Internet. The Internet
consists of around 35,000 ASes as compared to 1.6e+08 hosts [35]. The current rate of
increase in ASes in the internet topology is 45% each year [36]. Since both the ASBR and
internet routers are growing exponentially, obtaining an AS map of the Internet is feasible,
while obtaining the Internet map itself is very difficult, if not impossible.

•

As shown in Figure 4.2, in more than 99.5% of cases, a packet passes through less than six
ASes before reaching its destination [37, 38].
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Figure 4.2 Normalized and Cumulative Histograms of Autonomous System path lengths
•

Privately owned ASes may not always like to disclose their network details. If each router in
the AS participates in the marking scheme, then one can easily infer the network architecture
by observing the markings.
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•

AS number is 16 bits in length while IPv4 address is 32-bit long (IPv6 address is 128 bits).
Thus, encoding AS number needs less header space than encoding IP address, consequently,
with the same mechanism, AS path construction needs far less packets than whole network
path.

•

There is no scope for false positives because when a packet is marked, it carries the whole
AS number of the router and the victim can reconstruct the attack path without any
uncertainty. This relates to the third scheme, STM, proposed in this thesis report.

4.3

Header Overloading

We overload IP header to store router markings. Our mechanisms use 25 bits for marking.
•

The TOS Field
The type of service field is an 8 bit field in the IP header that is currently used to allow
special handling of traffic (for example, minimize delay, maximize throughput). This field
has been rarely used in the past and we believe that setting this field arbitrarily makes no
measurable difference in packet delivery.

•

The ID Field
The ID field is a 16-bit field used by IP to permit reconstruction of fragments. Naive
tampering with this field breaks fragment reassembly. Because less than 0.25% of all Internet
trace is fragments [39], we believe that overloading this field is appropriate. A more in-depth
discussion of the issues related to its overloading can be found in Savage’s work [40].

•

The Unused Fragment Flag
There is an unused bit in the fragment flags field that current Internet standards require to be
zero. Setting this bit to one has no effect on current implementations; with the exception that
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when receiving the packet, some systems will think it is a fragment. The packet, however, is
still successfully delivered, because it looks to those systems as though it is fragment 1 of 1.
4.4

Upstream Router Map

Figure 4.3 The Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) rooted at V
In the proposed schemes, the victim has a map of the upstream routers. The Directed
Acyclic Graph (DAG) rooted at V as shown in Figure 4.3, represents the network as seen from a
victim V and a distributed denial-of-service attack from A2 and A3. V could be either a single
host under attack or a network border device such as a firewall representing many such hosts.
Nodes Ri represent the ASBR, which we refer to as upstream routers from V. For every ASBR,
Ri, we refer to the set of ASBRs immediately before Ri in the graph as the children of Ri, e.g.
R3, R6 and R4 are R2’s children. The leaves {Ai} represent the potential attack origins, or
attackers. The attack path from Ai is the ordered list of ASBRs between Ai and V that the attack
packet has traversed, e.g. the dotted lines in the graph indicate two attack paths: (R6, R3, R2, R1)
and (R7, R4, R2, R1). The distance of Ri from V on a path is the number of routers between Ri
and V on the path. The attack graph is the graph composed of the attack paths. The packets are
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referred to as attack packets. A router is a false positive if it is in the reconstructed attack graph
but not in the real attack graph. A router is a false negative if it is in the true attack graph but not
in the reconstructed attack graph [41].
4.5

Simulations
To test the behavior of all the proposed schemes in real settings, we conducted a set of

experiments on simulated attacks using a real traceroute dataset obtained from CAIDA [42]. The
traceroute dataset contains 127,634 distinct traceroutes from a single source with the average
path length of 25. We use Cisco Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) RIBs collected from University
of Oregon Route Views Project [42] to convert IP addresses to AS numbers and hence obtained
the AS topology. The dataset had 7247 different ASes with an average of 4.6 ASes per path.
In all the tests, we assumed the single source of the traceroute dataset as the victim and
the whole traceroute dataset as the map of upstream routers from the victim. In each test, we
randomly selected a set of ASes ranging from 100-1500, as the attack originating AS and three
destinations from each AS as attackers. We then simulated a Distributed Denial of Service attack
which required attackers to launch an attack traffic against the victim. The attack packets were
marked by intermediate ASBRs while traversing from the attacker to the victim. Simulations also
included the reconstruction of the attack graph by the victim using the markings in the packets.
The System configuration on which these simulations were performed are as follows:
Hardware: Intel Pentium 4 machine with clock speed of 3 GHz and 2 GB RAM.
Software: Perl v 5.8.3 was used on a Red Hat Linux 3.2.3 Operating System.
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CHAPTER 5: HIT: HIERARCHICAL IP TRACEBACK
In this chapter, we propose HIT, a new probabilistic packet-marking approach for IP
traceback. HIT achieves effective attributes due to the fact that it mainly employs Autonomous
System Border Routers, ASBRs, in the marking procedure. ASBRs are few in number and more
powerful when compared to normal routers and have higher incentives to implement traceback
mechanisms.
Hierarchical IP Traceback (HIT) is a much more effective scheme as compared to many
other major traceback mechanisms such as Authenticated Marking Scheme (AMS), Fragment
Marking Scheme (FMS) and Fast Internet Traceback (FIT). The efficiency of HIT is measured
based on the properties like incremental deployment, network overhead, router overhead and
number of packets. In contrast to previous work, HIT simultaneously achieves all the following
properties: tens of packets to trace an attack path, scales to thousands of distributed attackers, is
incrementally deployable, and requires no per-flow or per-packet state at routers.
HIT implements Probabilistic Packet Marking scheme in two phases of trace back. The
first phase identifies the attack originating ASes while the second identifies the attacker within
each AS. Once an attack originating AS is identified, the corresponding administrator can be
notified who then proceeds to traceback to the attacker network location. The hierarchical nature
of HIT makes reconstruction very efficient and scalable.
The marking approaches for identifying the attack originating AS and the attacker itself
are termed as Inter-AS level marking and Intra-AS level marking respectively. The Inter-AS
level marking employs edge sampling algorithm while the Intra-AS level marking utilizes node
sampling. To allow for practical deployment, HIT overloads 25 bits of the IP header (the IP
identification field (16 bit), TOS field (8) and the unused Fragment Flag (1 bit)) to reserve bits
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for 5 fields of marking. Figure 5.1 depicts our choice for partitioning (25 bits) of the IP header as
follows:
•

11 bits for the edge marking, the components of which are 11 bit hashed ASNs

•

3 bits for distance field represents a maximum of 8 ASes a packet can traverse from the
source to the victim. In more than 99.5% cases, a packet passes through less than 6 ASes
before reaching its destination.

•

3 bits for generating 8 hash functions.

Edge-E
11 bits

Distance-DAS
3 bits

Hid-i

Hop-d

Node-h(IP)

2 bits

1 bit

8 bits

Figure 5.1 Overloading of the IP header
5.1

Inter-AS Marking
At this level only the ASBRs are involved in marking. An ASBR marks a packet with its

ASN (Autonomous System Number) only if the packet is forwarded to a router belonging to
another AS as shown in Figure 5.2 [34]. Thus, a packet may get marked only when it exits an
AS.
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AS1

Attacker

AS2

AS3

Victim

ASBR

Figure 5.2 Marking of a Packet Traversing from Attacker to Victim
The Inter-AS marking approach is similar to Authenticated Marking Scheme – II [41],
i

(

)

but instead of encoding the IP address of a router, we encode the ASBR, h AS j . This scheme
reserves bits for three fields, the Edge, Distance and Hash identification field for marking. To
accommodate for these markings, bits of the IP header are overloaded as shown in Figure 5.1.

a
+

a xor b

b
b xor c

+

c

+
+

b

c xor d

+

d

c

+

d
Victim

Reconstruction

Marking

Figure 5.3 XOR Encoding [41]
The marking and reconstruction procedure shown in Figure 5.3 are described as follows:
Every ASBR’s marks the outgoing packet, P, with a probability p when forwarding the packet. If
i

(

)

an ASBR decides to mark a packet, it encodes its ASN with a hashing algorithm h AS j , to
mark the edge field, E. The distance field is set to 0. The neighboring ASBR overwrites the edge
i

(

field, E, with h AS j

) ⊕ h (AS ) and increments D
i

AS.

j +1
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If an ASBR doesn't intend to mark,

a

DAS is incremented and other fields are left unscathed. The edge field received at the victim will
always have xor of two neighboring routers, except for samples from the ASBRs one hop from
the victim. Figure 5.4 describes the marking procedure at ASBR ASj
for each packet P,
let u be a random number from [0, 1)
if (u<=p) then
let i be a random integer from [0, 8)
P.Distance = 0
P.Hid = i
P.Edge = hi(ASj)
else
If (P.Distance = 0) then
P. Edge = P. Edge xor P. hi(ASj)
P. Distance = P. Distance + 1

Figure 5.4 Marking Procedure at ASBR ASj
5.2

AS Reconstruction
After enough packets have been sent, the victim would have received at least one

marking from every router. The victim reconstructs the ordered paths using the upstream AS
topology G. The victim arranges the edge markings of packets based on the distance field, DAS.
We denote edge markings with ith hash id at a distance d as E (d ) .
i

For every E (0 ) , the victim, v, compares the markings with the hash of its neighbors,
i

h i (neighbors(v )) from G. If the two values match, then the neighbor is considered to be in the
reconstructed graph, R0. R0 are the set of ASBRs, 0 hops away from the victim. For each ASBR,
x, in Rd and for each edge marking, E (d + 1) , the victim computes z = h ( x ) ⊕ E (d + 1)
i

i

i

and compares with the h (neighbors ( x )) from G. If the victim finds a match then the neighbor
i

is placed in the reconstructed graph Rd+1. This process is continued recursively until there are no
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edge markings at a distance, d.
let Rd be empty for 0 ≤d≤ maxd
for each neighbor n of Victim v in G
let count = 0
for l=0 to 2w -1
if (hi(n) = Ei(0)) then
count = count +1
if count > m then
insert n into R0
for d=0 to maxd - 1
for each x in Rd
for each neighbor u of x in G
let count = 0
for l=0 to 2w-1
for each edge Ei (d+1)
z=hi(x) xor Ei (d+1)
if (hi(u) = z) then
count = count +1; break
if count > m then
insert u in Rd+1
Output Rd for 0 ≤d≤ maxd
Figure 5.5 Reconstruction Procedure at Victim v
5.3

Intra-AS Marking
HIT reserves two fields for intra AS marking, an eight bit node field and a single bit

distance field. At intra AS level, normal routers in the attack originating AS are involved in
marking. These routers employ node sampling scheme and mark the attack packets with a
probability q. The marking routers embed the node field with the hash of their IP addresses,

h(IP ) , and the distance field with hop count obtained from the TTL field in the IP header. These
routers set the 5 least-significant bits of the packet’s TTL field (TTL[5..0]) to a global constant c,
and store the sixth bit of the TTL in the distance field d. This mechanism is the same as that used
in FIT [30]. When a packet arrives at its destination, the distance at which the packet was marked
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(

)

is computed as: d = d c − TTL[ 5.0 ] mod 64 , where d c denotes concatenation of the one bit
distance field d with the five bit TTL replacement constant c. Because legacy routers decrement
the TTL, the HIT distance is representative of the exact number of hops from a marking router,
rather than just the number of hops of traceback enabled routers [30]. Figure 5.6 describes the
marking procedure at router IPj

for each packet P,
let u be a random number from [0,1)
if (u<=q) or (P. d|c - TTL[5..0]) mod 64> 32) then
P.Node = h(IPj)
P.Distance = TTL[5]
TTL[4..0] = c
else
TTL = TTL -1
Figure 5.6 Marking Procedure at Router IPj
5.4

Reconstruction
Once the victim identifies the attack originating AS it gives a notification message to the

corresponding AS administrator regarding compromised nodes launching attack traffic within its
domain. The source AS then monitors the packets within its domain. The attack graph inside the
AS is reconstructed based on the hashed IP address of the marking routers and their respective
intra AS hop counts. Since node sampling is employed within the source AS, the markings that
are received are the hash of the IP address of the marking nodes. For a particular hop count, the
markings are compared with the hash values obtained from the upstream router topology
information. The neighbor graph information could be obtained through routing protocols such
as RIP and OSPF. Similar to the inter-AS level, the number of false positives and false negatives
are obtained by comparing the reconstructed attack graph and the original attack graph at each
intra AS hop count. Figure 5.7 describes the reconstruction procedure at victim v.
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Let Sd be empty for 0 ≤d≤ maxd
for d:= 0 to maxd - 1
for each marking n at d
for each child u of y at d in G
if( n = h(u))
insert u in Rd
Output Rd for 0 ≤d≤ maxd

Figure 5.7 Reconstruction Procedure at Victim v
5.5

Performance Evaluation
This section presents the general performance metrics considered to evaluate a traceback

mechanism. It discusses two metrics that have been used previously and details on a new metric:
Total Time to Traceback, proposed in this section. In the section, we present the simulation
results for the discussed metrics.
5.5.1

Performance Metrics
Three performance metrics, number of false positives (FP), number of packets required to

reconstruct the attack graph (Pkts) and total time to traceback to the attacker (TTT) are
considered for evaluating the performance of HIT.
•

Number of False Positives at Inter AS Level (FP)
We evaluate the performance of HIT with the number of false positives the map
reconstruction algorithm can produce. A false positive is said to occur when two ASBRs or
IP addresses share a common subset of hash values which are received by the reconstructing
victim. The victim will not be able to differentiate between the two ASBRs and will thus add
both of them to the reconstructed map. It is desirable to keep the false positive rate low even
in presence of several hundreds of attackers. The number of false positives generated during
reconstruction of the attack graph is drastically reduced if a number of hash functions are
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employed in the scheme. The intuition is that the probability for any AS to have the same
hash value as another for one hash function is 1

2x

, where x is the number of bits used to

encode the ASN information. Therefore the probability that the same can happen for y
independent hashing functions is ( 1

2

x

) y . We use an m-threshold scheme, wherein a node u

in Gm will only be considered to be in the attack path if more than m of its hash values from
2w hash functions match the right markings in the attack packets, where w is the number of
bits allocated for hash id field.
Let Ty denote the in-degree of element y in Rd-1, the reconstructed graph at a distance d-1 and
⏐Ed ⏐be the number of unique edge segments received by the victim at a distance d. Because
the hash value is 11 bits, the probability of a false positive for m threshold scheme is given
by

( 12 )

m

[5.1]

11

The expected number of false positives among y’s children for m- threshold scheme is given
by

Ty * Π1≤l ≤2w

Ed

211− w

[5.2]

The total number of expected false positives in y’s children for all y in the sets {Rd}0≤d≤maxd is
Rd −1

∑ Ty * Π1≤l ≤2
y =0

w

Ed

211− w

[5.3]

Computational Complexity of the algorithm is

O(∑ Rd ∗ Ed +1 )
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[5.4]

•

Number of False Positives at Intra AS Level (FP)
The average size of an AS ranges from 250 to 1000 nodes with an average diameter of 10.
Therefore the hash of IP address (32 bits) to 8 bits will result in nearly zero false positives.
Theoretically, the average number of false positives is given by
Number of Nodes at a hop count / 28

•

[5.5]

Number of Packets Required to Reconstruct (Pkt)
The second performance metric for map reconstruction is the number of packets that must be
sent to enable a victim to reconstruct the IP addresses of the routers on a single path. This
number calculated below provides an upper bound on the number of packets needed to
reconstruct a map containing multiple paths.
Let p be the marking probability of an ASBR for a path with d routers. The probability that a
given packet will deliver a sample from some router is at least

dp(1 − p ) d −1

[5.6]

The number of packets required for a victim to reconstruct a path of length d has an upper
bound of

ln d

p (1 − p ) d −1

[5.7]

There are a very few paths in the internet topology which exceed a path length 25 [40]. With
p=1/25 and d=25, number of packets required to reconstruct a path of 25 is 215. A packet
traverses through less than 6 ASBR on an average. With p=1/7 and d=7, packets required are
35.
•

Total Time to Traceback (TTT)
While number of packets needed to reconstruct is an important criteria, we believe that the
Total Time to Traceback is much more crucial. This is the time taken for the victim to
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construct the attack graph and to trace the attacker, once the victim detects that an attack has
been launched. Thus,
T = TPkt + TR

[5.8]

where TPkt is time taken to receive enough number of packets and TR is the reconstruction
time. Thus, the network would be under attack for a duration TTT (units). TR is traceback
mechanism dependant. There are two related consequences to a flooding attack – the network
load induced and the impact on the victim’s CPU. To load the network, an attacker generally
sends small packets as rapidly as possible since most network devices (both routers and
NICs) are limited not by bandwidth but by packet processing rate. Thus, TPkt is small. Thus,
to reduce load on the network and curb the attack fast, the traceback mechanism needs to be
efficient, so that TR will be small.
5.5.2
•

Simulation Results

AS Traceback
As more than 99.5% of paths encountered in the Internet have an AS path length less than or
equal to six, we propose to set the marking probability to 1/6.
Figure 5.8 shows the number of packets needed to reconstruct the AS attack graph
for different schemes. For m>2/4 scheme, after as few as 30 packets are received from
each AS path, a victim can construct more than 98% of ASes in the attack graph. For
m>6/8 scheme the number is slightly higher. The victim needs around 60 packets to
reconstruct around 95% of the routers.
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Figure 5.8 Number of Packets vs False Negatives
The performance of various schemes in terms of false positives is shown in Figure
5.9. As predicted, the m>6/8 scheme performs the best with just around 30 false positives
while m>2/4 scheme gives more number of false positives, around 200 in the presence of
500 attacking ASes.
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Figure 5.9 Number of Attackers vs False Positives

54

500

Figure 5.10 shows the time required to reconstruct the attack graph. The m>6/8
scheme takes the maximum time because of the presence of a large number of
combinations. Both m>3/4 and m>2/4 take similar time durations to reconstruct the
attack graph. It is observed that even in the worst case, the reconstruction of attack graph
takes less than 10 seconds.
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Figure 5.10 Number of Attackers vs Reconstruction time
•

IP Traceback
This section presents the simulation results for reconstruction mechanism of the IP path
within the originating AS. IP marking is based on node sampling rather than edge sampling.
Figure 5.11 shows the number of false positives generated for different sized ASes. For an
AS size of 1500 nodes there are approximately 3 false positives for a scheme without a
distance field while there are negligible false positives generated for a scheme with the
distance field.
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Figure 5.11 Number of Nodes vs False Positives
•

Comparison with AMS.
In this section, we compare the performance of HIT with AMS. AMS attempts to reconstruct
the whole IP attack path, while HIT first reconstructs the AS path and then reconstructs the
IP path within the attack originating AS. To make an accurate comparison between HIT and
AMS, we ran AMS on the same data set as HIT.
Figure 5.12 shows the number of packets required for a victim to traceback the attack
originating ASes. While HIT reconstructs to the attacker with less than 100 packets (for both
AS path reconstruction and originating IP location within the AS), AMS requires more than
2000 to effectively reconstruct the attack graph
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Figure 5.12 Number of Packets vs False Negatives
Figure 5.13 compares the performance of HIT and AMS in terms of false positives. HIT
(m > 2/4) gives more false positives than AMS (m>6/8). But, performance of HIT (m > 3/4) and
HIT (m > 6/8) are comparable to that of AMS (m>6/8). In the case of scheme, HIT, the false
positive rate is zero in the IP-traceback stage therefore we considered the false positives at the
AS level to be the total number of false positives for the scheme.
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Figure 5.13 Number of Attackers vs False Positives
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Figure 5.14 compares the reconstruction time for various threshold values of HIT with
m>6/8, threshold for AMS. The performance gain with HIT is obvious and this is a result of
dealing with smaller topologies first at AS-level and just the originating AS topology for the

Reconstruction Time(sec)

IP traceback phase.
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Figure 5.14 Number of Attackers vs Reconstruction Time
To compare the overall performance of different traceback schemes, we use a new metric
– Total Time to Traceback – as defined in Section 5.5.1. Figure 5.15 compares the TTT for
both AMS and HIT. For this purpose, we assumed that each attacker sends packets at a rate of
10 pkts/sec. Even in case of 1500 attackers, HIT (m>3/4) is able to traceback the attackers

Total Traeback Time (sec)

within 25 seconds while AMS needs around 275 seconds.
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Figure 5.15 Number of Attackers vs Total Traceback Time (sec)
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CHAPTER 6: FAST: FAST AUTONOMOUS SYSTEM TRACEBACK
This chapter describes, FAST (Fast Autonomous System Traceback), a novel packet
marking approach in which an AS path fingerprint is embedded in each packet, enabling a victim
to identify packets traversing the same AS paths through the Internet on a per packet basis,
regardless of the source IP address spoofing [2]. FAST features many unique properties. It is a
per-packet deterministic mechanism: each packet traveling along the same AS path can carry
only any of the pre-determined identifiers. This allows the victim to identify the source AS of the
packet in real-time thus prompting pro-active actions to curb the attack.
This approach embeds in each packet an identifier, based on the router path that a packet
traverses. The victim needs to receive only a few packets from a given AS path to reconstruct the
path. What makes this possible is that our packet marking is deterministic – all packets traversing
the same path carry one of the subset of markings. All previous marking schemes that we are
aware of are probabilistic in nature, in which the victim needs to collect a large number of
packets to reconstruct the path. In our approach, the victim can traceback in real-time to the
originating AS upon receiving just over 8 to 10 packets. FAST is extremely light-weight, both on
the routers for marking, and on the victims for decoding and filtering. Above all, FAST employs
only AS border routers for marking. The advantages of ASBRs being involved in marking has
been discussed in the previous chapter.
6.1

Node Append
The simplest marking algorithm – conceptually similar to the IP Record Route option

[40] – is to append each node's address to the end of the packet as it travels through the network
from attacker to victim. Consequently, every packet received by the victim arrives with a
complete ordered list of the routers it traverses – a built-in attack path. The node append
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algorithm is both robust and extremely quick to converge (a single packet), however it has
several serious limitations when normal routers are involved in marking. Principal among these
is the unfeasibly high router overhead incurred by appending data to packets in flight [40]. This
problem arises only when normal routers with lower processing speeds and memory are involved
in marking.
6.2

Marking
FAST employs ASBRs in node append mode of marking. An ASBR marks a packet with

its ASN (Autonomous System Number) only if the packet is forwarded to a router belonging to
another AS [34]. Thus, a packet may get marked only when it exits an AS. This scheme reserves
25 bits of the IP header for 3 fields of marking. The 25 bits of the IP header are overloaded as
follows
Table 6.1 Encoding Node Field into the IP header
Node Append - N
20 bits

Hop

Hid

3 bits

2 bits

In FAST each ASBR encodes its ASN, hi(AS) with hashing algorithm id, Hid, to mark
the Node field in a packet P. The hashing algorithm compresses the ASN from 16 bits to 4 bits.
Therefore each ASBR appends its 4 bit hashed ASN in the Node field. Since 99.7% of AS paths
are of length less than 6 this scheme reserves 20(4*5) bits for the Node field. The ASBR of the
AS containing the victim is not involved in marking hence on an average 5 ASBRs are involved
in marking in FAST. The Hop field is incremented by 3 every time a router marks the packet.
This field serves as an offset for the neighboring ASBR to mark in the Node field. Figure 6.2
shows the FAST packet marking, for packets traversing from the attacker A1 to attack
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originating AS through ASBRs AS1, AS4 and AS5. Figure 6.3 describes the marking procedure
at ASBR ASj.

h(AS1)

A1

A2

A3

AS1

AS2

AS3

AS4

h(AS1) | h(AS4)

AS6

h(AS1) | h(AS4) | h(AS5)

AS5

V

Figure 6.1 FAST Packet Marking

P.Hop = 0
for each packet P,
let i be a random integer from [0,4)
P.Node = hi (ASj)
P.Hop = P.Hop + 3
P.hid = i
Figure 6.2 Marking Procedure at ASBR ASj
6.3

Reconstruction
Once the attacker receives around 8-10 packets from each path it can begin the process of

reconstruction. The victim stores the upstream router map from which it can obtain sets of paths
of various path lengths. The victim compares the markings of a particular path length with hash
of ASes in suspect attack paths of the same path length. If the count of paths identified is greater
than or equal to a threshold m, then the paths are considered as attack paths.
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For all markings received at v
If(count(Nodes in suspected attack path) = count (Markings in a packet))
For marking x at hop i in the packet & For node n at hop i in suspected attack path
If (x = hash(n)) for all i then
Push(path) into array a
If count(path) in a > m then
Push(path) into array attack path
Figure 6.3 Reconstruction Procedure at Victim v
6.4

Performance Evaluation
Path reconstruction is the most critical performance aspect of a traceback scheme. Three

performance metrics, number of false positives (FP), number of packets required to reconstruct
the attack graph (Pkts) and reconstruction time (RT) are considered for evaluating the
performance of FAST.
6.4.1
•

Performance Metrics

Number of False Positives at Inter AS Level (FP)
We evaluate the performance of FAST with the number of false positives the map
reconstruction algorithm can produce. A false positive is said to occur when two ASBRs
share a common subset of hash values which are received by the reconstructing victim. The
victim will not be able to differentiate between the two ASBRs and will thus add both of
them to the reconstructed map. It is desirable to keep the false positive rate low even in
presence of several hundreds of attackers.
Theoretically, the number of false positives generated for A number of attackers at path
length P is given by
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(

⎡1 − 1 − 1
⎢⎣
2 P∗h

)

A

⎤∗N
⎥⎦

[6.1]

where h is the number of bits to which an ASN is hashed and N is the numbers of suspected
attack originating ASes at path length P. The traceroute datasets obtained from CAIDA had
1564 unique ASN at hop count 4. These constants when substituted in the theoretical formula
for 150 attackers and 4 bits ASN hash gives negligible false positives.
•

Number of Packets Required to Reconstruct (Pkt)
The second performance metric for map reconstruction is the number of packets that must be
sent to enable a victim to reconstruct the IP addresses of the routers on a single path. Since
this scheme utilizes a deterministic marking approach the number of packets to identify the
attack paths is 8-10.

6.4.2

Simulation Results
We considered the AS topology and the distribution of attackers on the Internet according

to the graph in figure 4.2. Simulations for the number of false positives generated for various
path lengths and attackers were conducted. Also, simulations of the reconstruction time for a
varied number of attackers were performed.
Figure 6.4 gives the relation between the AS path lengths and the number of false
positives for two schemes. The scheme with L=4 bits has fewer false positives as compared to
the scheme with L=3 bits for various path lengths. In both the schemes the number of false
positives reduce with increase in AS path length. In the scheme with L=4 bits the false positives
are zero at AS path length 4, while for the other scheme the false positives reduce to zero at 6 AS
hop counts. This graph justifies the theoretical formula, an increase in AS path length causes a
decrease in the number of false positives.
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Figure 6.4 AS Path Length vs Number of False Positives
Figure 6.5 gives a relation between the number of attackers and the number of false
positives for two schemes. The attack originating ASes were selected randomly in sets ranging
from 100 to 1000 ASes from the dataset obtained from CAIDA. The scheme with L=4 bits has
fewer false positives compared to the scheme with L=3 bits for various attackers. The former
scheme has a larger sample space as the 16 bit ASN is hashed to 4 bits causing fewer collisions
as compared to the latter scheme where the ASN is hashed to 3 bits.
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Figure 6.5 Number of Attackers vs Number of False Positives
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Figure 6.6 Number of Attackers vs Reconstruction Time (sec)
Figure 6.6 shows the relationship between the number of attackers and reconstruction time.
Scheme with L=4 bits takes lesser time to reconstruct to the attacker in comparison to the scheme
with L=3 bits for different sets of attackers. For both the schemes the reconstruction time is in
tens of seconds. With 1000 randomly picked attackers launching DDoS attacks, FAST only takes
20sec to reconstruct for the scheme with L=4 bits.
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CHAPTER 7: STM: SIMPLE TRACEBACK MECHANISM
Simple Traceback Mechanism is a simple scheme to trace back to the attackers
launching DDoS attacks. Like HIT, this scheme also traces back to the attacker in two phases. In
the first phase the victim traces back to the attack originating ASes and in the second phase the
attackers within these domains are identified.
7.1

Packet Marking:
In STM, as in all other PPM schemes, routers overwrite some fields in the IPv4 header.

The IP identification field of the IP header is overloaded as follows when the ASN is marked: 12
bits for the hash of ASN, 3 bits for the hash id and 1 bit for the flag field. The same field is
overloaded as follows when the IP address is encoded and used for marking the packet: 11 bits
for hash of IP address, 3 bits for hash id, 1 bit for distance and 1 bit for the flag id to identify if
the marking in the packet is the hash of ASN or IP address.
Table 7.1 Encoding Node Field into IP header

Node- h(ASN)/h(IP)

Hid

12 bits

2 bits

Flag

Distance

1 bit

1 bit

The STM router within an AS marks the forwarded packet with a probability of p or q,
which are global constants for all the STM routers (set to .01 and .04 in our experiments). Three
fields are marked by an STM router, the 12 bit ASN node field, 2 bit hash id field 1 bit flag field
and the 1 bit distance field when a packet is marked with probability p. Each router calculates a
hash the ASN it belongs to and sets the flag to zero. A router marking a packet with probability
q, encodes the IP node, distance and flag field. The marking router calculates the hash of its IP
address, sets the flag to one and sets the 5 least significant bits of the packet's TTL to a global
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constant c and stores the 6th bit of the TTL in the distance field [30]. This allows the victim to
determine the distance since the router's mark.
for each packet P,
let u be a random number from [0,1)
let I be a random number from [0,8)
if (p<u<=q) OR (P. fID|c - TTL[5..0]) mod 64> 32) then
P.Node = h(IPj)
P.Distance = TTL[5]
TTL[4..0] = c
P.ASN=0
P.Flag=1
P.Hid=0
else
TTL = TTL – 1
If (u<=p)
P.ASN = h(ASNj)
P.Hid=i
P.Flag=0

Figure 7.1 Marking Procedure at Router IPj
7.2

Path Reconstruction
The victim receives packets with ASN, IP, flag and distance fields. Upon receiving

enough packets the victim utilizes the upstream ASBR map to identify the attack originating AS.
All the ASBRs in the upstream map are scanned to match markings in the ASN field of the
packets with flag id set to zero. If there is a match these ASBRs are placed in the reconstructed
map. The victim receives markings of the nodes in the attack originating AS, from the h(IP )
and distance fields in the packets. The distance at which the packet was marked is computed as:

d = (d c − TTL[5.0 ] )mod 64 , where d c denotes concatenation of the one bit distance field d
with the five bit TTL replacement constant c [30]. The victim scans through the space of all
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possible IP addresses at a particular distance to match the markings from the packets. If a match
exists it is placed in the reconstructed attack graph.
7.3

Performance Metrics
Path reconstruction is the most critical performance aspect of a traceback scheme.

Performance is measured in terms of false positives, reconstruction time and number of packets
to traceback to the attacker.
•

False Positives
At the AS level the false positives are determined by the size of the AS topology and the
number of hashing algorithms employed for encoding.
Size of the AS topology / (212) 8

[7.1]

Within an AS the number of false positives is determined by the count of normal routers at a
distance, d, from the victim.
Routers within an AS at a distance, d, from victim /(211) 8
•

[7.2]

Number of Packets to Reconstruct the Attack Path
At both levels, node sampling is the mode of marking. The probability of receiving a packet
from a node i hops from the ASBR, given marking probability p is

Pm [i, p ] = p (1 − p ) i −1

[7.3]

We assume that samples from all the routers appear with the same likelihood as the furthest
router. The upper bound for the required number of packets for victim to reconstruct the path
is given by

ln d

p (1 − p ) i −1
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[7.4]

The experimental results strictly followed the theoretical analysis. 30 packets were
required to reconstruct a path to the attack originating AS. Since node sampling is the mode
of marking, SMT can identify a router far away before identifying all the routers
downstream. SMT could be at its best as a two packet mechanism, the first to reach the AS
and the second to reach the attacker.
•

Reconstruction Time
This parameter is dependent on the number of attackers, topology, and number of packets
required to identify the attackers. The total time for reconstruction is the time taken to
identify the attack originating AS and the attackers within an AS. A modern workstation can
calculate the SHA-1 hash of all 232 IP address in approximately 30 minutes [30]. There are
around 213 ASN in the internet today therefore on an average time taken to reconstruct to an
AS and the attacker within an AS will be less than a second. The experimental results tallied
with the theoretical analysis.

7.4

STM Advantages & Disadvantages
Since STM adopts 1 bit distance field of FIT [30] and therefore has the advantage of

freeing 4 additional bits in the IP header, which can be used for larger hash hence reducing the
number of false positives. STM also uses node sampling which reduces computational overhead
over AMS and other PPM schemes. STM uses the hash of an IP address in contrast to FIT which
requires the comparisons of fragments of the hashed IP address. This offers a significant
advantage over FIT which suffers from combinatorial explosion of computations. STM has a
better edge in reconstruction time over FIT as the number of nodes scanned to identify an
attacker is far less.
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The main disadvantage of STM arises due the node sampling mode of marking which
makes this scheme susceptible to pollution attacks, the attacker sends malicious fragments that
interfere with path reconstruction.
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CHAPTER 8: SIMULATIONS
This chapter gives an overview on the background work done for simulations. All the
simulations for generating an AS topology and for implementing the proposed algorithms were
developed using Perl. The simulator has been modularized, so as to enable the user to choose an
AS topology or Internet topology of any size. These topologies form the test bed to implement
existing and new algorithms. The Internet topology with IP paths was obtained from Route
Views, a project which was originally conceived as a tool for Internet operators to obtain realtime information about the global routing system from the perspectives of several different
backbones and locations around the Internet [42]. Data from Route Views is used by
organizations to map IP addresses to origin ASes for various topological studies. Route Views
collect Cisco BGP RIBs which are in the format of ‘network/ASN’.

3.0.0.0/8 80
4.0.0.0/8 3356
4.17.225.0/24 6496
4.17.226.0/23 6496
4.17.251.0/24 6496
4.17.252.0/23 6496
4.21.252.0/23 19198

Figure 8.1 BGP Table
Routing information in this file indicates that the network 3.0.0.0/8 belongs to the AS80,
4.0.0.0/8 to 3356 and so on. In order to map IP addresses from a path to their corresponding
ASN, the range of the IP addresses which belongs to an ASN was determined using the concepts
of subnets.
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Addressable Range

ASN

3.0.0.1 3.255.255.254
4.0.0.1 4.255.255.254
4.17.225.1 4.17.225.254
4.17.226.1 4.17.227.254
4.17.251.1 4.17.251.254
4.17.252.1 4.17.253.254
4.21.252.1 4.21.253.254

80
3356
6496
6496
6496
6496
19198

Figure 8.2 Address Range for ASN
A real traceroute dataset was obtained from the Cooperative Association for Internet Data
Analysis (CAIDA). The traceroute dataset contained complete and incomplete distinct
traceroutes from a single source to multiple destinations.
T
128.8.7.4
206.27.119.251 0
0
1086048002 R
48.602 16 240 S
0
C
128.8.7.28,0.505,1
128.8.0.9,0.324,1
128.8.0.82,0.475,1
128.8.0.234,0.287,1
206.196.177.49,0.317,1 206.196.178.45,0.830,1 65.114.173.1,0.654,1 205.171.9.61,0.656,1
205.171.8.182,4.914,1 205.171.17.33,4.911,1 205.171.8.229,25.315,1 205.171.20.170,25.088,1
205.171.20.66,24.958,1 63.145.140.150,104.469,1
63.148.10.2,51.061,1
T
128.8.7.4
203.80.119.251 0
0
1086048002 N
0
0
0
G
5
I
128.8.7.28,0.744,1
128.8.0.9,0.366,1
128.8.0.82,0.694,1
128.8.0.234,0.272,1
206.196.177.49,0.374,1 206.196.178.45,0.989,1 65.114.173.1,0.684,1 205.171.9.93,0.713,1
205.171.209.114,1.877,1 205.171.251.38,2.118,1 192.205.32.29,2.860,1 12.123.9.82,3.510,1
12.122.10.30,25.957,1 12.122.9.142,26.560,1 12.122.10.14,64.354,1 12.123.199.113,63.474,1
Figure 8.3 Traceroute Dataset
Complete paths were identified and used for simulations. Each of the IP addresses from
the complete traceroute paths was then mapped to the network it belonged to and the
corresponding ASN was taken into an AS file which was used in forming the AS topology.
There were IP addresses for which there were no corresponding legitimate AS and therefore it
was not possible to fully convert every trace route path to an AS path. Some IP addresses could
not be mapped to an AS because they lacked a matching prefix in RouteViews [43]. Other
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addresses could not be mapped because they fell within reserved address space. In our
conversion from IP paths to AS paths we replaced such addresses with their adjacent ASes. The
AS file was given as input to another Perl tool to generate the AS topology.

14742 16097 21651 6364
26793 3549
209 4628 27 7527 21687 6922 600 14751 8039 17819 81 2901 7462 16871 14861 14517 104

Figure 8.4 AS Topology
The first line in the above file indicates that AS14742 has children AS16097, AS21651 and
AS6364. Similarly the IP topology is also generated.
All the three algorithms proposed were tested on this topology. The outputs for all the algorithms
are as follows:
HIT
For 25
-------FP 4.8
FN 0
RT 0
For 50
-------FP 12.8
FN 0
RT 0
For 75
-------FP 18.8
FN 0
RT 0

For 25 attack paths,
Marking probability: .25,
Packets sent through each path: 150.
HIT with 1 hashing algorithm gives the following results
False Positives: 4.8
False Negatives: 0
Reconstruction time: 0.
Similar results were obtained for implementing HIT and AMS with hashing
algorithms.

Figure 8.5 HIT Results
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FAST
R 2914 10910 7349
R 3561 6762 3269
R 1239 5588 2819
R 2914 9299 7629

For 50 attack paths, m>3/4.

False Positives 6
False Negatives 0

False Positives 6
False Negatives 0

The reconstructed attack paths are 2914 10919 7349,
3561 6762 3269 and so on.

Figure 8.6 FAST Results
STM
For 25
-------FP 0
FN 0
RT 0

For 25 attack paths,
Marking probability: .25,
Packets sent through each path 30
False Positives: 0
False Negatives: 0
Reconstruction time: 0

Figure 8.7 STM Results
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CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
This thesis presented three trace back schemes against Distributed Denial of Service
attacks. All the three schemes were implemented on an AS and IP topology. The schemes aimed
at providing a realistic solution to the problem which arises due to the fact that the attacker's
packets may traverse through a number of domains under different administrative controls. Most
of the methods are very limited because for those schemes it is necessary to have access to all
routers along the path from victim to attacker, and this is often not the case. The proposed
schemes give control to the Autonomous system administrator to monitor its traffic and do the
required to halt the DDoS attack.
The Internet Hierarchical IP Traceback mechanism was developed to provide
experimental results for evaluating its performance metrics in comparison with those of
Authenticated Marking Scheme. Theoretically and experimentally HIT proved to be a better
scheme because of its inherent nature of running on the AS topology. Reconstruction time was
one of the main parameters which evaluated the performance of this scheme. Even, in the worst
case the reconstruction time for HIT was in the order of 10s of seconds. This is a very important
metric because of the tremendous growth in automated and distributed nature of the DDoS
attacks which requires the victim to reconstruct to the attacker within seconds.
The performance of FAST was evaluated on a dataset of varying hop length. With the
internet topology distributed such that most of the AS paths have path lengths of four and five,
FAST performs very efficiently at these path lengths. FAST also requires a very few packets to
reconstruct to the attack originating AS.
Simple Traceback Mechanism was developed to improve the performance of Fast
Internet Traceback Scheme. It is an efficient scheme as the victim reconstructs to the attacker in
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no time and with a very few packets. But this scheme has its own drawbacks as it is susceptible
to pollution attacks. Encryption and authentication schemes have to be employed with SMT to
handle its limitations.
Future work can incorporate schemes like algebraic approach to traceback on an AS
topology. A mix of reactive and preventive schemes (filtering) can be implemented against
DDoS attacks.

76

REFERENCES
[1] Mary Landesman. What is a DDoS attack,
http://antivirus. about. com/od/what is a virus/a/ddosattacks.htm, December 2004.
[2] Abraham Yaar, Adrian Perrig and Dawn Song. Pi: A Path Identification Mechanism to
Defend against DDoS Attack, IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, Pg 93-107,
May 2003.
[3] Drew Dean, Matt Franklin, and Adam Stubblefield. An Algebraic Approach to IP traceback,
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security, Volume 5, pg 119-137, May 2002.
[4] Rik Farrow. DDoS is neither dead nor forgotten,
http://www.spirit.com/Network/net1200.html, September 2000.
[5] http://www.cnn.com/2005/TECH/internet/03/22/university.hackers.ap/index.html, March
2005.
[6] Jelena Mirkovic, Sven Dietrich, David Dittrich, Peter Reiher and Radia Perlman, “Intenet
Denial of Sevice Attack & Defense Mechanisms”, First edition, Prentice Hall Professional
Technical Reference, USA, Dec 2004.
[7] Distributed Denial of Service Attacks and their defenses,
http://www.lancs.ac.uk/postgrad/pissias/netsec/ddos/.
[8] Worm Propagation,
http://ee.tamu.edu/~reddy/ee689_04/lec7.pdf
[9] Internet Security Systems. SYN flood,
http://www.iss.net/security_center/advice/Exploits/TCP/SYN_flood/default.htm
[10] Norman. Attacks against weaknesses in the TCP/IP protocol,
http://www.norman.com/documents/wp_smurf.shtml
[11] Rik Farrow. Distributed Denial of Service Attacks (DDoS),
http://chinese-school.netfirms.com/computer-article-denial-of-service.html
[12] CERT Incident Note IN-99-07
http://www.cert.org/incident_notes/IN-99-07.html#trinoo, November 2001.
[13] Distributed Attack Tools,
http://packetstorm.decepticons.org/distributed/.
[14] Paul J. Criscuolo. Distributed Denial of Service: Trin00, Tribe Flood Network, Tribe Flood
Network 2000, and Stacheldraht,
http://www.ciac.org/ciac/documents/CIAC- 2319_Distributed_Denial_of_Service.pdf.

77

[15] Sven Dittrich, An analysis of the “Shaft” distributed denial of service tool,
http://adelphi.edu/~spock/shaft_analysis.txt, November 2001.
[16] Analysizing Distributed Denial of Service Tools: The shaft case
http://www.adelphi.edu/~spock/lisa2000-shaft.pdf.
[17] http://staff.washington.edu/dittrich/misc/mstream.analysis.txt
[18] Phatbot Trojan Analysis,
http:://www.lurhq.com/phatbot.html
[19] http://www.sans.org/infosecFAQ/threats/face.htm
[20] CERT. Code Red Worm exploiting Buffer Overflow in IIS Indexing Service DLL.
http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2001-19.html, January 2002.
[21] Nicholas Weaver. A Brief History of The Worm.
http://www.securityfocus.com/infocus/1515, November 2001.
[22] http://www.crime-research.org/library/Richard.html
[23] http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/L/local_area_Network_LAN.html
[24] Bradely Mitchell. DMZ- Demilitarized Zone.
http://compnetworking.about.com/cs/networksecurity/g/bldef_dmz.htm. August 2004.
[25] Managing the Threats of Denial-of-Service Attacks, CERT/CC
http://www.cert.org/archive/pdf/Managing_DoS.pdf, January 2002.
[26] William W. Martin, Honey Pots and Honey Nets - Security through Deception
http://rr.sans.org/attack/deception.php, February 2002.
[27] Eric Cole. Hackers Beware, New Riders Publishing, USA, Feb 2002.
[28] Peter Harrison. Monitoring Server Performance
http://www.siliconvalleyccie.com/linux-hn/mrtg.htm#_Toc92809393
[29] Thomas E. Daniels Benjamin Kuperman Packet Tracker, Final Report, CERIAS Technical
Report 2000-22.
http://www.silicondefense.com/research/itrex/archive/tracingpapers/buchholz00
packettracker.pdf, November 2001.
[30] Abraham Yaar, Adrian Perrig and Dawn Song. FIT: Fast Internet Traceback, Proceedings of
Infocom, March 2005.

78

[31] Hal Burch and Bill Cheswick, “Tracing anonymous packets to their approximate source”,
Unpublished paper, December 1999.
[32] Michael Goodrich. Efficient packet marking for large-scale IP traceback, Proceedings
of the 9th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, Pg 117–126,
November 2001.
[33] J. Li, M. Sung, J. Xu, and L. Li. Large-scale IP traceback in high-speed Internet: Practical
techniques and theoretical foundation, Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Security
and Privacy, Pg 115-129, May 2004.
[34] Arjan Durresi, Vamshi Parchuri, Leonard Barolli, Rajagopal Kannan and S.S.Iyengar.
Efficient and secure Autonomous System based traceback, Journal of Interconnection
Networks, Volume 5, Pg 151-164, May 2004.
[35] M. Fayed, P. Krapivsky, J. Byers, M. Crovella, D. Finkel and S. Render. On the size
distribution of Autonomous Systems, Technical Report, Boston University, Jan 2003.
[36] Damein Magoni and Jean Jacques Pansiot. Analysis of the autonomous system network
topology, ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review, Vol 3, Pg 26-37, Jul 2001.
[37] J. Mogul and S. Deering. Path MTU Discovery, RFC 1191, Nov 1990.
[38] Alex C. Snoeren, Craig Partridge, Luis A. Sanchez, Christine E. Jones, Fabrice
Tchakountio, Beverly Schwartz, Stephen T. Kent and W. Timothy Strayer. Hash based IP
Traceback, Proceedings of ACM SIGCOMM 2001, Pg 3-14, August 2001.
[39] S. Kent, C. Lynn, J. Mikkelson, and K. Seo. Secure Border Gateway Protocol (SecureBGP) - Real World Performance and Deployment Issues, Proceedings of Symposium on
Network and Distributed System Security, February 2000.
[40] Stefan Savage, David Wetherall, Anna Karlin and Tom Anderson. Practical Network
Support for IP Traceback, Proceedings of ACM SIGCOMM 2000, Pg 295-306, August
2000.
[41] Dawn Xiaodong Song and Adrian Perrig. Advanced and Authenticated Marking Schemes
for IP trace back, IEEE infocom 2001, pg 878-886, April 2001.
[42] David Meyer. University of Oregon Route Views Archive Project.
http://archive.routeviews.org/, June 2004.
[43] Young Hyun, Andre Broido and K Claffy. Traceroute and BGP AS Path Incongruities,
Internetworking 2003 conference, June 2003.
[44] Jimmy Sproles and Will Byars. Cyber Terrorism.
http://www-cs.etsu.edu/gotterbarn/stdntppr/#Professionals, March 1998.

79

[45] Douglas Schweitzer. Internet Relay Chat – IRC the place to be.
http://www/pcflank.com/art32.htm.
[46] Mike Chapple. Egress Filtering.
http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/tip/129843.html
[47] Gary C. Kessler. Defenses Against Distributed Denial of Service Attacks
http://www.garykessler.net/library/ddos.html, Nov 2000.

80

APPENDIX: PROGRAMS
HIT.pl
#!/usr/bin/perl -w -I./Cryptix-1.16/blib/arch
BEGIN { push @INC, qw(. .. ../lib ../../lib ../../../lib) }
package Crypt::MD5;
use Exporter;
use DynaLoader;
@ISA = qw(Exporter DynaLoader);
bootstrap Crypt::MD5;
$MD5 = new Crypt::MD5;
ref($MD5) || print "Error - $MD5\n";
$deepest = -1;
%attacknodes = ();
$victim = 0;
# Parameters
$samples = 5;
@tests = ( 100,250, 550, 750, 1000,1500);
$markprob = 0.25; # Probability of router to mark a packet
$num_pack = 455;# Number of packets each attacker sends
$match_threshold = 3; # if ( $match > $match_threshold ) range of match is 0
.. 8
$probabilistic = 1;
$storeprob = 2500 / 125000;
# read in all the long paths
print "Read all paths\n";
open( INPUT, "zcat HIT.dat.gz |" ) || die "Could not open and zcat
HIT.dat.gz\n";
@allpaths = ();
while ( $_ = <INPUT> ) {
if ( $storeprob > rand()) {
chop;
@ips = split /\s/, $_;
if ( $victim == 0 ) {
$victim = $ips[0];
} elsif ( $victim != $ips[0] ) {
die "$victim != $ips[0]\n";
}
push @allpaths, [@ips];
}
}
close( INPUT );
print "Done reading all paths, stored $#allpaths paths\n";
print "Read neighbors\n";
%neighbor = ();
if ( 1 ) {
open( NEIGHBOR, "zcat HITneigh.dat.gz |" ) || die "Could not open
neighbor file\n";
while ( <NEIGHBOR> ) {
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chop;
@ns = split /\s/, $_;
$neighbor{$ns[0]} = [()];
for ( $i=1; $i <= $#ns; $i++ ) {
if ( $ns[0] != $ns[$i] ) {
push @{ $neighbor{$ns[0]}}, $ns[$i];
}
}
}
close( NEIGHBOR );
}
print "Done reading neighbors\n";
for $v ( @tests ) {
$avgfp = 0;
$avgfn = 0;
$avgtime = 0;
print "$v\n";
for $w ( 1 .. $samples ) {
# print " .\n";
simulate( $v );
$avgfp += $fp;
$avgtime += $delta_t;
$avgfn += $fn;
}
$avgfp /= $samples;
$avgfn /= $samples;
$avgtime /= $samples;
print "FP $avgfp\n";
print "FN $avgfn\n";
print "RT $avgtime\n";
}
exit( 0 );
sub compute_routers_at_depth {
my ( $vip, $distance ) = @_; # vip = victim ip, prev = next hop
my $i = 0;
my $att;
my $curdepth = $routers_at_depth_list[$distance];
if ( $distance > $deepest ) {
print "Ups - something is wrong $distance $vip\n";
}
if ( ! exists $curdepth->{$vip} ) {
$curdepth->{$vip} = 0;
$routers_at_depth_num[$distance]++;
}
if ( ! exists $attacknodes{ $distance, $vip } ) {
# We are at the leaf
# print " Leaf\n";
} else {
# look through all the attackers
$att = $attacknodes{ $distance, $vip };
# Recurse
for ( $i=0; $i <= $#{$att}; $i++ ) {
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compute_routers_at_depth( $att->[$i], $distance + 1 );
}
}
}
sub MD5_8bitv1 {
my ($str, $s) = @_;
my $ret = 0;
$str = $str . "1" . $s;
$MD5->reset();
$MD5->add($str);
$ret = unpack("L",$MD5->digest()) % (2**11);
return $ret;
}
sub MD5_8bitv2 {
my ($str, $s) = @_;
my $ret = 0;
$str = $str . "2" . $s;
$MD5->reset();
$MD5->add($str);
$ret = unpack("L",$MD5->digest()) % (2**11);
return $ret;
}

sub simulate {
my ($num_attackers) = @_;
my @attackerpath = ();
my $num_paths = -1;
my %attackercount = ();
my $adjust = 0;
my @tmp = ();
my @marked_hash = (); # 3-dimensional array [depth][frag#][maked#]
my $j;
my $i;
my $k;
my $path;
my $marked;
my $depth;
my $ip;
my @tmp2;
my $frag;
my $ipnum;
my $hash;
my $ipnumf;
my $hashf;
my $mharr;
my $found;
my %tmp;
my $start_time;
my $end_time;
my @suspected_set = ();
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my $susp;
my $neigh;
my $s;
my $matches;
my $n;
my $neighhash;
my $susphash;
my @fp = (); # False positive at level
my @fn = (); # False negative at level
$delta_t = 0;
my $rout;
my @selected = ();
# print "Simulating $num_attackers attackers\n";
%attacknodes = ();
$deepest = -1;
whileloop: while ( $num_attackers > 0 ) {
do {
$j = int(rand( $#allpaths + 1 ));
@tmp = grep { $_ == $j } @selected;

} until ( $#tmp < 0 );
$num_attackers--;
push @selected, $j;
$k = $allpaths[$j];
$adjust = 0;
for ( $i=0; $i < $#{$k}; $i++ ) {
if ( $k->[$i] != $k->[$i+1] ) {
push @tmp, $k->[$i];
if ( ! exists $attacknodes{ $i - $adjust, $k->[$i]} ) {
$attacknodes{ $i - $adjust, $k->[$i] } = [($k->[$i+1])];
$attackercount{ $i - $adjust, $k->[$i], $k->[$i+1] } = 1;
}
else {
@tmp2 = grep {$_ == $k->[$i+1]} @{$attacknodes{ $i $adjust, $k->[$i] }};
if ( $#tmp2 < 0 ) {
push @{ $attacknodes{ $i - $adjust, $k->[$i]} }, $k->[$i+1];
$attackercount{ $i - $adjust, $k->[$i], $k->[$i+1]} = 1;
}
else {
$attackercount{ $i - $adjust, $k->[$i], $k->[$i+1]}++;
}
}
}
else {
$adjust++;
}
}
push @tmp, $k->[$#{$k}];
if ( $#tmp > $deepest ) {
$deepest = $#tmp;
}
push @attackerpath, [@tmp];
}
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# print "Simulate sending and marking packets\n";
for $j ( 0 .. $deepest ) {
@tmp2 = ();
for $i ( 0 .. 3 ) {
$tmp2[$i] = [()];
}
$marked_hash[$j] = [@tmp2];
}
if ( $probabilistic ) {
for ( $i=0; $i <= $#attackerpath; $i++ ) {
$path = $attackerpath[$i];
# print "simulating path @{$path}\n";
for ( $k = 0; $k < $num_pack; $k++ ) {
$marked = 0;
$depth = 0;
for ( $j = $#{$path}; $j >= 1; $j-- ) {
if ( rand() < $markprob ) {
$marked = 1;
$depth = $j;
$ip = $path->[$j];
}
}
if ( $marked == 1 ) {
# The packet was marked
$ipnum = $ip;
$frag = int(rand( 4 ));
if ( $frag == 4 ) { $frag = 3; }
$hash = MD5_8bitv1( $ipnum, $frag );
if ( $depth > 1 ) {
$ipnumf = $path->[$depth - 1];
$hashf = MD5_8bitv2( $ipnumf, $frag );
$hash = $hash ^ $hashf;
}
$mharr = $marked_hash[$depth][$frag];
# Only add it if it is not yet in it
$found = 0;
for $m ( 0 .. $#{$mharr} ) {
if ( $mharr->[$m] == $hash ) {
$found = 1;
last;
}
}
if ( $found == 0 ) {
# print "Added a sample\n";
push @{$mharr}, $hash;
}
}
}
}
} else {
# deterministic marking
for ( $i=0; $i <= $#attackerpath; $i++ ) {
$path = $attackerpath[$i];
for ( $j = $#{$path}; $j >= 1; $j-- ){$ipnum = $path->[$j];
for $frag ( 0 .. 3 ) {
$hash = MD5_8bitv1( $ipnum, $frag );
if ( $j > 1 ) {
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$ipnumf = $path->[$j - 1];
$hashf = MD5_8bitv2( $ipnumf, $frag );
$hash = $hash ^ $hashf;
}
$mharr = $marked_hash[$j][$frag];
# Only add it if it is not yet in it
$found = 0;
for $m ( 0 .. $#{$mharr} ) {
if ( $mharr->[$m] == $hash ) {
$found = 1;
last;
}
}
if ( $found == 0 ) {
push @{$mharr}, $hash;
}
}
}
}
}
# print "Done simulating\n";
# print "Computing routers_at_depth\n";
@routers_at_depth_num = ();
@routers_at_depth_list = ();
for ( $i=0; $i <= $deepest; $i++ ) {
%tmp = ();
$routers_at_depth_list[$i] = {%tmp};
}
compute_routers_at_depth( $victim, 0 );
# print "Routers at depth:\n";
for $i ( 0 .. $#routers_at_depth_num ) {
# print " $i: $routers_at_depth_num[$i]\n";
}
# start analyzing
$start_time = time();
$suspected_set[0] = [($victim)];
for $depth ( 1 .. $deepest ) {
$suspected_set[$depth] = [()] ;
for $susp ( @{ $suspected_set[$depth-1] } ) {
if ( ! exists $neighbor{ $susp } ) {
$s = $susp ;
die "$s has no neigbors\n";
}
$neigh = $neighbor{$susp};
for $n ( @{$neigh} ) {
$matches = 0;
for $frag ( 0 .. 3 ) {
$neighhash = MD5_8bitv1( $n, $frag );
if ( $depth > 1 ) {
$susphash = MD5_8bitv2( $susp, $frag );
$neighhash = $neighhash ^ $susphash;
}
@tmp = grep {$_ == $neighhash}
@{$marked_hash[$depth][$frag]};
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if ( $#tmp >= 0 ) {
$matches++;
}
}
if ( $matches > $match_threshold ) {
@tmp = grep {$_ == $n} @{$suspected_set[$depth]};
if ( $#tmp < 0 ) {
push @{$suspected_set[$depth]}, $n;
#$tmp = $n ;
#print "Found a suspect at level $depth:$tmp\n;
}
}
}
}

#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
}

}
$end_time = time();
# print "Analyzing results\n";
$fp = $fn = 0;
for $i ( 1 .. $deepest ) {
$fp[$i] = 0;
$fn[$i] = 0;
$susp = $suspected_set[$i];
$rout = $routers_at_depth_list[$i];
for $j ( 0 .. $#{$susp} ) {
if ( exists $rout->{ $susp->[$j] } ) {
delete $rout->{ $susp->[$j] };
} else {
# $k = ipnum2str( $susp->[$j] );
# print "False positive at level $i: $k\n";
$fp[$i]++;
$fp++;
}
}
foreach $j ( keys %{$rout} ) {
# $k = ipnum2str( $j );
# print "False negative at level $i: $k\n";
$fn[$i]++;
$fn++;
}
}
print "Number of false positives:\n";
for $i ( 1 .. $deepest ) {
print "
$i: $fp[$i]\n";
}
print "Number of false negatives:\n";
for $i ( 1 .. $deepest ) {
print "
$i: $fn[$i]\n";
}
$delta_t = $end_time - $start_time;
print "The analysis took $delta_t seconds\n";
print "Done.\n";
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FAST.pl
#!/usr/bin/perl -w -I./Cryptix-1.16/blib/arch
BEGIN { push @INC, qw(. .. ../lib ../../lib ../../../lib) }
#initialize MD5 stuff
package Crypt::MD5;
use Exporter;
use DynaLoader;
@ISA = qw(Exporter DynaLoader);
bootstrap Crypt::MD5;
$MD5 = new Crypt::MD5;
ref($MD5) || print "Error - $MD5\n";
package FAST;
$MD5 = new Crypt::MD5;
%MD5hasher = ();
$NUMPACKETS= 12;
#Hash Function
sub hash
{
my $hash;
$MD5->reset();
$MD5->add($_[0],$_[1]);
$hash=unpack("L",$MD5->digest()) % 16;
return $hash;
}
sub round
{
my($number) = shift;
return int($number + .5);
}
open(FILE,'Fast100AS.dat');
open(FILE1,'>FASTpaths.dat');
@line=<FILE>;
chop @line;
@Fid =(); @Mark=();
for ($i=0;$i<=$#line;$i++)
{#print" line $i--------------------";
@record=();$j=0;
@recordit = split /\s/, $line[$i];
for($k=0;$k<=$#recordit;$k++)
{
if($recordit[$k] ne $recordit[$k+1])
{
$record[$j]=$recordit[$k];if($j ne 0) { print FILE1 "$record[$j] ";}
$j++;
}
}
for($pkt=0;$pkt<$NUMPACKETS;$pkt++)
{$dummy=rand(rand(rand(rand(time()))));
srand($dummy ^ $$);
$Marking[$pkt]='';$fid=round(rand(3));
#print"Pkt =$pkt\n";
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for($j=1;$j<=$#record;$j++)
{
$Marking[$pkt]=$Marking[$pkt].hash($record[$j],$fid).'.';
}$cnt=-1;#print "Marking $Marking[$pkt]\n";
for($p=0;$p<=$#Mark;$p++)
{#print "$Marking[$pkt] eq $Mark[$p] and $fid eq $Fid[$p]\n";
if($Marking[$pkt] eq $Mark[$p] and $fid eq
$Fid[$p]){$p=$#Mark+1;}else {$cnt =$cnt+1;}
}
if($cnt eq
$#Mark){push(@Mark,$Marking[$pkt]);push(@Fid,$fid);}#print"Mark @Mark\n Fid
@Fid\n";}
}
print FILE1 "\n";
}
$MarkCut=$#Mark;
1;
*****************************************************************************
#!/usr/bin/perl -w -I./Cryptix-1.16/blib/arch
require 'FAST.pl';
BEGIN { push @INC, qw(. .. ../lib ../../lib ../../../lib) }
#initialize MD5 stuff
package Crypt::MD5;
use Exporter;
use DynaLoader;
@ISA = qw(Exporter DynaLoader);
bootstrap Crypt::MD5;
$MD5 = new Crypt::MD5;
ref($MD5) || print "Error - $MD5\n";
$MD5 = new Crypt::MD5;
%MD5hasher = ();
$victim = 27;
sub hash
{
my $hash;
$MD5->reset();
$MD5->add($_[0],$_[1]);
$hash=unpack("L",$MD5->digest()) % 16;
return $hash;
}
open(File,"FASTNoRep.dat") || die "Could not open neighbor file 1\n";
@line1=<File>; chop @line1;
for($r=0;$r<$#line1;$r++)
{
@arr= split /\s/, $line1[$r];@harr0=();@harr1=();@harr2=();@harr3=();
for($i=0;$i<=$#arr;$i++)
{
push @harr0,hash($arr[$i],0);#print "rr= @harr0\n";
push @harr1,hash($arr[$i],1);
push @harr2,hash($arr[$i],2);
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push @harr3,hash($arr[$i],3);
}
push @hsec0,[@harr0];#print "sec $hsec0[$r]->[1]\n";
push @hsec1,[@harr1];
push @hsec2,[@harr2];
push @hsec3,[@harr3];
}
push @Table,[@hsec0],[@hsec1],[@hsec2],[@hsec3];
$Tablecnt=$#{($Table->[0])->[0]};
$t=($Table[0]->[0])->[3];
#print "This is $t";
close (File);
$Start=time();
for($i=0;$i<=$FAST::MarkCut;$i++)
{
@Marks=();
@Marks = split /\./, $FAST::Mark[$i];#print"Marks @Marks\n";
for($hid=0;$hid<=$#line1;$hid++)
{
$p=$#{$Table[$FAST::Fid[$i]]->[$hid]};
if($#Marks <= $p)
{
$cnt=-1;
for($j=0;$j<=$#Marks;$j++)
{
if($Marks[$j] ne ($Table[$FAST::Fid[$i]]->[$hid])->[$j+1])
{
$j=$#Marks+1;
}
else{$cnt=$cnt+1;}
}
if($cnt eq $#Marks){
print "$line1[$hid]\n";
}
}
}
}
$End=time();
$Time=$End-$Start;
print" Time = $Time\n";
*****************************************************************************

#!/usr/bin/perl -w -I./Cryptix-1.16/blib/arch
open(file,'FASTATT.dat');
#open(file2,'FASTpaths.dat');
open(file2,'Fast100AS.dat');
@val=<file>;
@path=<file2>;
chop @val;chop @path;
$m=3;$fp=0;$Recon=0;
$start=time();
for($i=0;$i<=$#val;$i++)
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{
$cnt=1;
for($j=$i+1;$j<=$#val;$j++)
{
if($val[$i] eq $val[$j] and $val[$i] ne ' ')
{
$cnt=$cnt+1;$val[$j]=' ';
}
}$dummy=0;
if($cnt >= $m)
{print"R $val[$i]\n";
$Recon=$Recon+1;
for($k=0;$k<=$#path;$k++)
{
# print "$val[$i] eq $path[$k]\n";
@first=split /\s/,$val[$i];@sec=split /\s/,$path[$k];$node=$val[$i];
# if($val[$i] eq $path[$k])
if($#sec eq $#first)
{$b=-1;
for($n=0;$n<=$#sec;$n++)
{
if($first[$n] eq $sec[$n])
{# print "$first[$n] eq $sec[$n]\n";
$b=$b+1;
}
}
if($b eq $#sec) {$k=$#path+1;}# print "ATT $node \n";}
else {$dummy=$dummy+1;}
}
else {$dummy = $dummy+1;}#print "Dum =$dummy\n";}
}
if($dummy eq $#path+1){$fp=$fp+1;}
}
}
$end=time();
$Time = $end-$start;
print"False Positives $fp\n";
$Fn=$Recon-($#path+1)-$fp;print "False Negatives $Fn =$Recon-($#path+1)-$fp";
print"\n$Time";
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STM.pl
#!/usr/bin/perl -w -I./Cryptix-1.16/blib/arch
BEGIN { push @INC, qw(. .. ../lib ../../lib ../../../lib) }
#initialize MD5 stuff
package Crypt::MD5;
use Exporter;
use DynaLoader;
#use strict;
#use warnings;
@ISA = qw(Exporter DynaLoader);
bootstrap Crypt::MD5;
$MD5 = new Crypt::MD5;
ref($MD5) || print "Error - $MD5\n";
$MD5 = new Crypt::MD5;
%MD5hasher = ();
$victim = 27;
$p=.25;
@test=(100);
open(File,"05.ASNpath.dat") || die "Could not open neighbor file 1\n";
open(File3,"Topology.dat");
open(File1,"031.IPpaths.dat") || die "Could not open neighbor file 1\n";
#open(File,"temp.dat");open(File1,"temp1.dat");open(File2,"temp2.dat");
open(File2,"zcat HIT.dat.gz |")|| die "Could not open AS topology file 1\n";
@line=<File>; chop @line;
@line1=<File1>; chop @line1;
@line2=<File2>; chop @line2;
@line3=<File3>; chop @line3;
#Toplology of AS
#for($k=0;$k<$#line;$k++)
#{
# @records=split /\s/,$line[$k];
# push(@attacker,$records[$#records]);
# for($j=1;$j<=$#records;$j++)
# {
#
if((grep{$_ == $records[$j]}@topology) eq
0){push(@topology,$records[$j]);}
# }
#}
@topology=split /\s/,$line3[0];
#Main Program
for $v (@test)
{
$Fp=0;
$Fn=0;
$Rt=0;
simulate($v);
#$Fn = $#attackpath-($#Rep-$Fp);
#$Rt=$end-$start;
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print" $v\n.....\nFP = $Fp\n";print" FN $Fn\n";
print" RT $Rt\n";
}
*****************************************************************************
#Hash Function
sub hash
{
my $hash;
$MD5->reset();
$MD5->add($_[0],$_[1]);
$hash=unpack("L",$MD5->digest()) % (2**$_[2]);
return $hash;
}
sub Norep
{my $k;my @record=();
for($k=0;$k<=$#_;$k++)
{
if($_[$k] ne $_[$k+1])
{
push(@record,$_[$k]);
}
}
return @record;
}
*****************************************************************************
sub simulate
{
@attackpath=();@Pks=();@hashes=();@Nodes=();@AttAS=();@AttIP=();
$dummy=rand(rand(rand(rand(time()))));
srand($dummy ^ $$);
for($i=0;$i<=$_[0];$i++)
{
$r=int(rand(125000));@recordAS=();@recordIP=();
@recordAS=split /\s/,$line[$r];print "line $i\n";print
"@recordAS\n";push(@ActAS,@recordAS);@attackpath=Norep(sort(@ActAS));
@recordIP=split /\s/,$line1[$r];print
"@recordIP\n";push(@ActIPs,@recordIP);@ActIP=Norep(sort(@ActIPs));
for($pkt=0;$pkt<=500;$pkt++)
{
@Pks=();$d=0;
for($j=$#recordAS;$j>=0;$j--)
{
$cnt=-1;
$r=rand(1);
$hid=int(rand(4));
if($r < .01)
{$flag=0;$temp=$recordAS[$j];if((grep{$_ == $recordAS[$j]}@attackpath)
eq 0){push(@attackpath,$recordAS[$j]);}}#print"This is AS marking
$recordAS[$j]\n";}
else{if($r<.04 and $r > .01){$flag=1;$temp=$recordIP[$j];}}#print"This
is IP marking]\n";}
# print "Num of Nodes $#Nodes\n";
}
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for($q=0;$q<=$#Nodes;$q++)
{#print"$Nodes[$q]->[0] eq hash($temp,$hid,13) and $Nodes[$q]->[1]
eq $hid and $Nodes[$q]->[2] eq $flag\n";
if($Nodes[$q]->[0] eq hash($temp,$hid,13) and $Nodes[$q]->[1] eq
$hid and $Nodes[$q]->[2] eq $flag){}else{$cnt=$cnt+1;}#print"cnt=$cnt\n node$#node
}
if($cnt == $#Nodes)
{@Pks=();
push(@Pks,hash($temp,$hid,13),$hid,$flag); push
@Nodes,[@Pks];#print"@Pks\n";
}
}
}
print"Attackpath @attackpath\n";
print"Marking is done\n";
*****************************************************************************
#Reconstruction
$start=time();
@Sys=();@s=();
for($q=0;$q<=$#Nodes;$q++)
{
if($Nodes[$q]->[2] eq 0)
{
@Sys=grep{hash($_,$Nodes[$q]->[1],13)
push(@s,grep{$_ >= 0}@Sys);
}
}
#print"s=@s\n";

eq $Nodes[$q]->[0]}@topology;

@Rep=();@Cnt=();
for($t=0;$t<=$#s;$t++)
{
@Cnt=grep{$_ == $s[$t]}@s;
if($#Cnt>=1)
{
if((grep{$_ == $Cnt[0]}@Rep) eq 0)
{
push(@Rep,$Cnt[0]);
}
}
}
print"The attack originating ASes\n@Rep\n";
for($k=0;$k<$#line2;$k++)
{
$cnt=-1;
@records=split /\s/,$line2[$k];
@recordsIP=split /\s/,$line1[$k];
for($s=0;$s<=$#records;$s++)
{
if((grep{$_ == $records[$s]}@Rep) ne 0)
{
$cnt=$cnt+1;
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}
}
if($cnt==$#records){push (@IP,@recordsIP);push @count,
[@recordsIP];}#print"recordIP = @records\n";}
}
print "\nNumber of paths in IP topology $#count\n";
#Remove Repetitions in IP\n
@out1=Norep(sort(@IP));
print "The IP topology\n @out1\n";
@s=();@Sys=();
for($q=0;$q<=$#Nodes;$q++)
{
if($Nodes[$q]->[2] eq 1)
{
@Sys=grep{hash($_,$Nodes[$q]->[1],13) == $Nodes[$q]->[0]}@out1;#print"Sys
@Sys\n";
push(@s,@Sys);
}
}
@Suspect=();@Cnt=();
for($t=0;$t<=$#s;$t++)
{
@Cnt=grep{$_ eq $s[$t]}@s;
if($#Cnt>=1)
{
if((grep{$_ eq $Cnt[0]}@Suspect) eq 0)
{
push(@Suspect,$Cnt[0]);
}
}
}
print"Suspect @Suspect\n";
*****************************************************************************
print"Calculating the number of False Positives\n";
for($l=0;$l<=$#ActIP;$l++)
{
push(@Pre,(grep{$_ eq $ActIP[$l]}@Suspect));
}
$end=time();
$Time=$end-$start;
print"\nAttackers in the suspected set \n @Pre\n";
print"\nActual Attack graph\n @ActIP\n";
$Fn=$#ActIP-$#Pre;
$Fp=$#Suspect+$Fn-$#ActIP;print
print "\nFalse Negatives $Fn\nFalse Positives $Fp";
print"\nRT = $Time";
}
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STM2.pl
#!/usr/bin/perl -w -I./Cryptix-1.16/blib/arch
BEGIN { push @INC, qw(. .. ../lib ../../lib ../../../lib) }
#initialize MD5 stuff
package Crypt::MD5;
use Exporter;
use DynaLoader;
@ISA = qw(Exporter DynaLoader);
bootstrap Crypt::MD5;
$MD5 = new Crypt::MD5;
ref($MD5) || print "Error - $MD5\n";
$MD5 = new Crypt::MD5;
%MD5hasher = ();
$victim = 27;
$p=.25;
@test=(50,150,250,500,1000);
open(File,"05.ASNpath.dat") || die "Could not open AS file 1\n";
open(File3,"Topology.dat");
open(File1,"031.IPpaths.dat") || die "Could not open IP file 1\n";
#open(File,"temp.dat");
#open(File1,"temp1.dat");open(File2,"temp2.dat");
open(File2,"zcat HIT.dat.gz |")|| die "Could not open AS topology file 1\n";
@line=<File>; chop @line;
@line1=<File1>; chop @line1;
@line2=<File2>; chop @line2;
@line3=<File3>;chop @line3;
*****************************************************************************
#Toplology of AS
#for($k=0;$k<$#line2;$k++)
#{@records=();
# @records=split /\s/,$line2[$k];
# push(@attacker,$records[$#records]);
# for($j=0;$j<=$#records;$j++)
# {
#
if((grep{$_ == $records[$j]}@topology) eq
0){push(@topology,$records[$j]);}
# }
#}
@topology=split /\s/,$line3[0];print"@topology";
*****************************************************************************
#Main Program
for $v (@test)
{
$Fp=0;
$Fn=0;
$Rt=0;
simulate($v);
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#$Fn = $#attackpath-($#Rep-$Fp);
#$Rt=$end-$start;
print" $v\n.....\nFP = $Fp\n";print" FN $Fn\n";
print" RT $Rt\n";
}
*****************************************************************************
#Hash Function
sub hash
{
my $hash;
$MD5->reset();
$MD5->add($_[0],$_[1]);
$hash=unpack("L",$MD5->digest()) % (2**$_[2]);
return $hash;
}
*****************************************************************************
#Remove Repetitions
sub Norep
{my $k;my @record=();
for($k=0;$k<=$#_;$k++)
{
if($_[$k] ne $_[$k+1])
{
push(@record,$_[$k]);
}
}
return @record;
}
*****************************************************************************
#IP Topology
sub order
{
my $i;
for($i=0;$i<25;$i++)
{
my $k=0;$t=0;$s=0;
while($t<=$#count)
{$we=index($IPd[$i][$t],'.');
if($IPd[$i][$t] ne '#' and $we > 1)
{
for ($j=$t;$j<$#count;$j++)
{
if ($IPd[$i][$t] eq $IPd[$i][$j+1] && $IPd[$i][$j+1] ne '#' )
{
$IPd[$i][$j+1]= '#';
}
}
$OrderedIP[$i][$s]=$IPd[$i][$t];print"Ordered $OrderedIP[$i][$s]\n";
$countIP[$i]++;
$s++;
}
$t++;
}
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print " Count of different nodes at hop $i countas[$i] = $countIP[$i]\n";
}
}
*****************************************************************************
# MARKING
sub simulate
{
@attackpath=();@Pks=();@hashes=();@Nodes=();@AttAS=();@AttIP=();
$dummy=rand(rand(rand(rand(time()))));
srand($dummy ^ $$);
for($i=0;$i<=$_[0];$i++)
{
$r=int(rand(125000));@recordAS=();@recordIP=();
@recordAS=split /\s/,$line[$r];print "line $i\n";print
"@recordAS\n";push(@ActAS,@recordAS);@attackpath=Norep(sort(@ActAS));
@recordIP=split /\s/,$line1[$r];print
"@recordIP\n";push(@ActIPs,@recordIP);@ActIP=Norep(sort(@ActIPs));
for($pkt=0;$pkt<=1000;$pkt++)
{
@Pks=();$d=0;
for($j=$#recordAS;$j>=0;$j--)
{
$cnt=-1;
$r=rand(1);
$hid=int(rand(4));
if($r < .01) {$flag=0;$temp=$recordAS[$j];$d=0;}
if($r < .04 and $r >= .01){$flag=1;$temp=$recordIP[$j];$d=0;}#print"This
is IP marking]\n";}
# print "Num of Nodes $#Nodes\n";
if($r >= .04){$d=$d+1;}
}
for($q=0;$q<=$#Nodes;$q++)
{#print"$Nodes[$q]->[0] eq hash($temp,$hid,12) and $Nodes[$q]->[1]
eq $hid and $Nodes[$q]->[2] eq $flag and $Nodes[$q]->[3] eq $d\n";
if($Nodes[$q]->[0] eq hash($temp,$hid,12) and $Nodes[$q]->[1] eq
$hid and $Nodes[$q]->[2] eq $flag and $Nodes[$q]->[3] eq
$d){}else{$cnt=$cnt+1;}#print"cnt=$cnt\n node- $#node
}
if($cnt == $#Nodes)
{@Pks=();
push(@Pks,hash($temp,$hid,12),$hid,$flag,$d); push
@Nodes,[@Pks];#print"@Pks\n";
}
}
}
print"Attackpath\n @attackpath\n";
print"Marking is done\n";
*****************************************************************************
#Reconstruction
$start=time();
@Sys=();@s=();
for($q=0;$q<=$#Nodes;$q++)
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{
if($Nodes[$q]->[2] eq 0)
{
@Sys=grep{hash($_,$Nodes[$q]->[1],12) eq $Nodes[$q]->[0]}@topology;
push(@s,grep{$_ >= 0}@Sys);
}
}
#print"s=@s\n";
@Rep=();@Cnt=();
for($t=0;$t<=$#s;$t++)
{
@Cnt=grep{$_ == $s[$t]}@s;
if($#Cnt>=2)
{
if((grep{$_ == $Cnt[0]}@Rep) eq 0)
{
push(@Rep,$Cnt[0]);
}
}
}
print"The attack originating ASes\n@Rep\n";
*****************************************************************************
#IP topology with each attacking AS
for($k=0;$k<$#line2;$k++)
{
$cnt=-1;@records=();@recordsIP=();
@records=split /\s/,$line2[$k];
@recordsIP=split /\s/,$line1[$k];
for($s=0;$s<=$#records;$s++)
{
if((grep{$_ == $records[$s]}@Rep) ne 0)
{
$cnt=$cnt+1;
}
}
if($cnt==$#records)
{push @count, [@recordsIP];
for($dist=0;$dist<=$#recordsIP;$dist++)
{
$IPd[$dist][$pos]= $recordsIP[$dist];print "$IPd[$dist][$pos]\n"; #$$
push (@IP,@recordsIP); print"recordIP = @records\n";
}
$pos=$pos+1;
}
}
order();
print "\nNumber of paths in IP topology $#count\n";
#Remove Repetitions in IP\n
#@out1=Norep(sort(@IP));
#print "The IP topology\n @out1\n";
**********************************************************************
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#Identifying the suspect set
@s=();
for($q=0;$q<=$#Nodes;$q++)
{
if($Nodes[$q]->[2] eq 1)
{
for($IPcnt=0;$IPcnt<$countIP[$Nodes[$q]->[3]];$IPcnt++)
{#print"d= $Nodes[$q]->[3] hash($OrderedIP[$Nodes[$q]>[3]][$IPcnt],$Nodes[$q]->[1],12)",hash($OrderedIP[$Nodes[$q]>[3]][$IPcnt],$Nodes[$q]->[1],12)," == $Nodes[$q]->[0]\n";
if(hash($OrderedIP[$Nodes[$q]->[3]][$IPcnt],$Nodes[$q]->[1],12) ==
$Nodes[$q]->[0])
{
# @Sys=grep{hash($_,$Nodes[$q]->[1],12) == $Nodes[$q]>[0]}@out1;#print"Sys @Sys\n";push(@s,@Sys);
push(@s,$OrderedIP[$Nodes[$q]->[3]][$IPcnt]);#print"Entered\n"
}
}
}
}
print"HELLO @s\n";
@Suspect=();@Cnt=();
for($t=0;$t<=$#s;$t++)
{
@Cnt=grep{$_ eq $s[$t]}@s;
if($#Cnt>=2)
{
if((grep{$_ eq $Cnt[0]}@Suspect) eq 0)
{
push(@Suspect,$Cnt[0]);
}
}
}
print"Suspect @Suspect\n";
****************************************************************************
print"Calculating the number of False Positives\n";
for($l=0;$l<=$#ActIP;$l++)
{
push(@Pre,(grep{$_ eq $ActIP[$l]}@Suspect));
}
$end=time();
$Time=$end-$start;
print"\nAttackers in the suspected set\n @Pre - $#Pre\n";
print"\nActual Attack graph\n @ActIP - $#ActIP\n";
$Fn=$#ActIP-$#Pre;
$Fp=$#Suspect+$Fn-$#ActIP;
print "\nFalse Negatives $Fn\False Positives $Fp\n RT = $Time";
}
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STM3.pl
#!/usr/bin/perl -w -I./Cryptix-1.16/blib/arch
BEGIN { push @INC, qw(. .. ../lib ../../lib ../../../lib) }
#initialize MD5 stuff
package Crypt::MD5;
use Exporter;
use DynaLoader;
@ISA = qw(Exporter DynaLoader);
bootstrap Crypt::MD5;
$MD5 = new Crypt::MD5;
ref($MD5) || print "Error - $MD5\n";
$MD5 = new Crypt::MD5;
%MD5hasher = ();
$victim ='128.8.7.4';
$p=.25;
@test=(5);
#open(File,"05.ASNpath.dat") || die "Could not open neighbor file 1\n";
#open(File3,"Topology.dat");
#open(File1,"031.IPpaths.dat") || die "Could not open neighbor file 1\n";
open(File,"temp.dat");
open(File1,"temp1.dat");open(File2,"temp2.dat");
#open(File2,"zcat HIT.dat.gz |")|| die "Could not open AS topology file 1\n";
@line=<File>; chop @line;
@line1=<File1>; chop @line1;
@line2=<File2>; chop @line2;
@line3=<File3>;chop @line3;
****************************************************************************
#Toplology of AS
for($k=0;$k<$#line2;$k++)
{@records=();
@records=split /\s/,$line2[$k];
push(@attacker,$records[$#records]);
for($j=0;$j<=$#records;$j++)
{
if((grep{$_ == $records[$j]}@topology) eq
0){push(@topology,$records[$j]);}
}
}
#@topology=split /\s/,$line3[0];#print"@topology";
****************************************************************************
#Main Program
for $v (@test)
{
$Fp=0;
$Fn=0;
$Rt=0;
simulate($v);
#$Fn = $#attackpath-($#Rep-$Fp);
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#$Rt=$end-$start;
print" $v\n.....\nFP = $Fp\n";print" FN $Fn\n";
print" RT $Rt\n";
}
****************************************************************************
#Hash Function
sub hash
{
my $hash;
$MD5->reset();
$MD5->add($_[0],$_[1]);
$hash=unpack("L",$MD5->digest()) % (2**$_[2]);
return $hash;
}
****************************************************************************
sub Norep
{my $k;my @record=();
for($k=0;$k<=$#_;$k++)
{
if($_[$k] ne $_[$k+1])
{
push(@record,$_[$k]);
}
}
return @record;
}
****************************************************************************
sub order
{
my $i;
for($i=0;$i<25;$i++)
{
my $k=0;$t=0;$s=0;
while($t<=$#count)
{$we=index($IPd[$i][$t],'.');
if($IPd[$i][$t] ne '#' and $we > 1)
{
for ($j=$t;$j<$#count;$j++)
{
if ($IPd[$i][$t] eq $IPd[$i][$j+1] && $IPd[$i][$j+1] ne '#' )
{
$IPd[$i][$j+1]= '#';
}
}
$OrderedIP[$i][$s]=$IPd[$i][$t];#print"Ordered $OrderedIP[$i][$s]\n";
$countIP[$i]++;
$s++;
}
$t++;
}
print " Count of different nodes at hop $i countas[$i] = $countIP[$i]\n";
}
}
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****************************************************************************

sub compute_routers_at_depth {
my ( $vip, $distance ) = @_; # vip = victim ip, prev = next hop
my $i = 0;
my $att;
my $curdepth = $routers_at_depth_list[$distance];
if ( $distance > $deepest ) {
print "Ups - something is wrong $distance $vip\n";
}
if ( ! exists $curdepth->{$vip} ){
$curdepth->{$vip} = 0;
$routers_at_depth_num[$distance]++;
}
if ( ! exists $attacknodes{ $distance, $vip } ) {
# We are at the leaf
# print " Leaf\n";
} else {
# look through all the attackers
$att = $attacknodes{ $distance, $vip };
# Recurse
for ( $i=0; $i <= $#{$att}; $i++ ) {
compute_routers_at_depth( $att->[$i], $distance + 1
);
}
}
}
****************************************************************************
# MARKING
sub simulate
{
@attackpath=();@Pks=();@hashes=();@Nodes=();@AttAS=();@AttIP=();
$dummy=rand(rand(rand(rand(time()))));
srand($dummy ^ $$);
for($i=0;$i<=$_[0];$i++)
{
$r=int(rand(100));@recordAS=();@recordIP=();
@recordAS=split /\s/,$line[$r];#print "line $i\n";print "@recordAS\n";
push(@ActAS,@recordAS);@attackpath=Norep(sort(@ActAS));
@recordIP=split /\s/,$line1[$r];#print "@recordIP\n";
push(@ActIPs,@recordIP);@ActIP=Norep(sort(@ActIPs));
for($pkt=0;$pkt<=300;$pkt++)
{
@Pks=();$d=0;
for($j=$#recordAS;$j>=0;$j--)
{
$cnt=-1;
$r=rand(1);
$hid=int(rand(4));
if($r < .01) {$flag=0;$temp=$recordAS[$j];$d=0;}
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if($r < .04 and $r >= .01){$flag=1;$temp=$recordIP[$j];$d=0;}#print"This
is IP marking]\n";}
# print "Num of Nodes $#Nodes\n";
if($r >= .04){$d=$d+1;}
}
for($q=0;$q<=$#Nodes;$q++)
{#print"$Nodes[$q]->[0] eq hash($temp,$hid,12) and $Nodes[$q]->[1]
eq $hid and $Nodes[$q]->[2] eq $flag and $Nodes[$q]->[3] eq $d\n";
if($Nodes[$q]->[0] eq hash($temp,$hid,12) and $Nodes[$q]->[1] eq
$hid and $Nodes[$q]->[2] eq $flag and $Nodes[$q]->[3] eq
$d){}else{$cnt=$cnt+1;}#print"cnt=$cnt\n node- $#node
}
if($cnt == $#Nodes)
{@Pks=();
push(@Pks,hash($temp,$hid,12),$hid,$flag,$d); push
@Nodes,[@Pks];#print"@Pks\n";
}
}
}
print"Attackpath\n @attackpath\n";
print"Marking is done\n";
****************************************************************************
$start=time();
@Sys=();@s=();
for($q=0;$q<=$#Nodes;$q++)
{
if($Nodes[$q]->[2] eq 0)
{
@Sys=grep{hash($_,$Nodes[$q]->[1],12) eq $Nodes[$q]->[0]}@topology;
push(@s,grep{$_ >= 0}@Sys);
}
}
#print"s=@s\n";
@Rep=();@Cnt=();
for($t=0;$t<=$#s;$t++)
{
@Cnt=grep{$_ == $s[$t]}@s;
if($#Cnt>=2)
{
if((grep{$_ == $Cnt[0]}@Rep) eq 0)
{
push(@Rep,$Cnt[0]);
}
}
}
print"The attack originating ASes\n@Rep\n";
****************************************************************************
$pos=0; %attacknodes = ();
$deepest = -1;
%attackercount=();
for($j=0;$j<=$#line2;$j++)
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{
$cnt=-1;@records=();@recordsIP=();
@records=split /\s/,$line2[$j];
@recordsIP=split /\s/,$line1[$j];
for($s=0;$s<=$#records;$s++)
{
if((grep{$_ == $records[$s]}@Rep) ne 0)
{
$cnt=$cnt+1;
}
}
@tmp=();
if($cnt == $#records)
{
$k =[@recordsIP];print"@recordsIP\m";
$adjust = 0;
for ( $i=0; $i < $#{$k}; $i++ ) {
if ( $k->[$i] ne $k->[$i+1] ) {
push @tmp, $k->[$i];
if ( ! exists $attacknodes{ $i - $adjust, $k->[$i]} ) {
$attacknodes{ $i - $adjust, $k->[$i] } = [($k->[$i+1])];
$attackercount{ $i - $adjust, $k->[$i], $k->[$i+1] } = 1;
}
else {
@tmp2 = grep{$_ eq $k->[$i+1]}@{$attacknodes{$i - $adjust, $k->[$i] }};
if ( $#tmp2 < 0 ) {
push @{ $attacknodes{ $i - $adjust, $k->[$i]} }, $k->[$i+1];
$attackercount{ $i - $adjust, $k->[$i], $k->[$i+1]} = 1;
} else {
$attackercount{ $i - $adjust, $k->[$i], $k->[$i+1]}++;
}
}
} else {
$adjust++;
}
}
push @tmp, $k->[$#{$k}];
$att1=$attacknodes{0,$victim};
print"att1",$att1->[0],"\n";
if ( $#tmp > $deepest ) {
$deepest = $#tmp;print"deepest - $deepest\n";
}
push @IPtopology, [@tmp];
}
}
print "Computing routers_at_depth\n";
@routers_at_depth_num = ();
@routers_at_depth_list = ();
for ( $i=0; $i <= $deepest; $i++ ) {
%tmp = ();
$routers_at_depth_list[$i] = {%tmp};
}
compute_routers_at_depth( $victim, 0 );
print "Routers at depth:\n";$all_routers=0;
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for $i ( 0 .. $#routers_at_depth_num )
{$all_routers=$all_routers+$routers_at_depth_num[$i];
print " $i: $routers_at_depth_num[$i]\n";
}
$att1=$attacknodes{0,$victim};
print"att1",$att1->[0],"\n";
print "Coun $all_routers\n";
@Arr=();$t=0;$n=1;$k=1;
push(@Arr,$victim);$vip=$victim;
for($i=0;$i<$all_routers;$i++)
{
if($k eq 0){$k=$routers_at_depth_num[$n];$n=$n+1;$t=$t+1;}
$arr1=$attacknodes{$t,$vip};
for($rp=0;$rp<=$#{$arr1};$rp++)
{
push(@Arr,$arr1->[$rp]);#print "Arr @Arr";
}
$k=$k-1;
$vip=$Arr[$i+1]
}
print"ARR @Arr\n -$#Arr";
$first=0;$last=$routers_at_depth_num[0];
for($hop=0;$hop<$#routers_at_depth_num ;$hop++)
{@A=();
for($cnt=$first;$cnt<$last;$cnt++)
{
push(@A,$Arr[$cnt]);
}
push @DistArr,[@A];print"A @A";
$first=$last;
$last=$first+$routers_at_depth_num[$hop+1];
}
****************************************************************************
@s=();
for($q=0;$q<=$#Nodes;$q++)
{
if($Nodes[$q]->[2] eq 1)
{
for($IPcnt=0;$IPcnt<=$#{$DistArr[$Nodes[$q]->[3]]};$IPcnt++)
{print"d= $Nodes[$q]->[3] hash(",$DistArr[$Nodes[$q]->[3]]>[$IPcnt],",$Nodes[$q]->[1],12)",hash($DistArr[$Nodes[$q]->[3]]>[$IPcnt],$Nodes[$q]->[1],12)," == $Nodes[$q]->[0]\n";
if(hash($DistArr[$Nodes[$q]->[3]]->[$IPcnt],$Nodes[$q]->[1],12) ==
$Nodes[$q]->[0])
{
# @Sys=grep{hash($_,$Nodes[$q]->[1],12) == $Nodes[$q]>[0]}@out1;#print"Sys @Sys\n";push(@s,@Sys);
push(@s,$DistArr[$Nodes[$q]->[3]]->[$IPcnt]);#print"Entered\n"
}
}
}
}
print"HELLO @s\n";
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@Suspect=();@Cnt=();
for($t=0;$t<=$#s;$t++)
{
@Cnt=grep{$_ eq $s[$t]}@s;
if($#Cnt>=2)
{
if((grep{$_ eq $Cnt[0]}@Suspect) eq 0)
{
push(@Suspect,$Cnt[0]);
}
}
}
print"Suspect @Suspect\n";
****************************************************************************
print"Calculating the number of False Positives\n";
for($l=0;$l<=$#ActIP;$l++)
{
push(@Pre,(grep{$_ eq $ActIP[$l]}@Suspect));
}
$end=time();
$Time=$end-$start;
print"\nAttackers in the suspected set present in actual attack graph\n @Pre
- $#Pre\n";
print"\nActual Attack graph\n @ActIP - $#ActIP\n";
$Fn=$#ActIP-$#Pre;print "\nFn=$#ActIP-$#Pre\n";
$Fp=$#Suspect+$Fn-$#ActIP;print"Fp=$#Suspect+$Fn-$#ActIP\n";
print "\nFalse Negatives $Fn\nFalse Positives $Fp";
print"\nRT = $Time";
}
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